

























A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for 
























      On September 28, 1991, President George H. W. Bush directed all nuclear bomber 
aircraft to “stand down” from day-to-day alert and download their nuclear weapons to 
return back to the base’s weapons storage areas.  Bush also directed an Air Force missile 
officer crews who oversaw 150 Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 
to disable their launch control center’s capability to launch them.  These ICBMs had been 
removed from the National War Plan.  These actions were part of the forthcoming 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II which would be signed by Bush and 
Russian Federation (RF) President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993.  The treaty would 
reduce deployed nuclear warheads from approximately 21,000 on both sides to 3-3,500 
warheads for each. 
     With this significant reduction 20 years ago, the U.S. and RF continue with thousands 
of deployed nuclear weapons.  The U.S. still continues to program, fund and prioritize the 
U.S. nuclear triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bomber 
aircraft.  Why?  As Bush stated, the cold war days are over. 
     Presidents in the Nuclear Age have wielded their influence and views on the role of 
nuclear weapons.  They have led through strategic vision, innovation, policies, and 
treaties on nuclear weapons role in the national security strategy.  The nuclear triad has 
declined in importance from the height of the Cold War, yet it is still perpetuated into the 
21st century.  To analyze the nuclear triad, one must examine the Department of Defense 
(DoD) which is its primary proponent.  DoD has acted in a predictive bureaucratic 
iii 
 
manner by clinging to systems and a framework that was successful in the past and 
perpetuates in the future.  This stagnation of the successful and slow, perpetuates the 
nuclear triad and its associated enterprise infrastructure.  Most importantly, clinging to 
past successful system prevents the U.S. from re-focusing its national security strategy by 
prioritizing, programming, and funding precious American taxpayer dollars towards the 
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     On October 26, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis and just four days after 
President John F. Kennedy announced to the American people from the Oval Office of a 
Soviet Union build-up of ballistic nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Secretary of the Air Force 
Eugene M. Zuckert wrote the president to inform him of a new milestone: 
While I know the tremendous pressure under which you are working, I believe 
you would like to be informed that today the Air Force has achieved, on schedule 
as planned nearly three years ago, the initial operational capability with the 
Minuteman missile.  The first three missiles, sited near Malmstrom Air Force 
Base, Montana, have had warheads installed and have been assigned targets in the 
USSR.1 
 
Later in the letter, Zuckert wrote about the missiles “in the event of the imminent national 
emergency...can be launched within thirty minutes.”2  This was a long time ago…in a 
different period, the Cold War era.  It’s hard to believe back then the U.S. and Soviet 
Union were so close to using nuclear weapons:  “It shall be the policy of this nation to 
regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western 
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full 
retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”3 
     Fast forward to today in which the U.S. and Russian Federation (RF) worked together 













weapons from Syria, and the U.S. and RF signed in 2010 another nuclear arms reduction 
treaty. 
     However, during the Cold War, things were different in this bipolar world.  The U.S. 
and the Soviet Union sought to build-up their nuclear weapons so as to convince the other 
side of its seriousness and credibility of their arsenal.  After World War II, the U.S. 
sought to develop and build their nuclear forces to ensure its superiority.  The U.S. built 
this nuclear arsenal around a “triad” of strategic delivery systems it was developing in the 
early 1950’s and deployed in the early 1960’s.  The components of the nuclear triad are 
bomber aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles each possessing unique characteristics that enhance the triad as a whole.4   
     In Chapter 1, “Relic of a Bygone Era?” the analysis examines the history and 
development of the U.S. nuclear triad and its role during the Cold War and how 
presidents viewed it.  The analysis also looks at the policies that impacted the nuclear 
triad and the decline of its importance after the fall of the Soviet Union.  The analysis 
discusses the reasons the nuclear triad continues to last:  deterrence is still important, 
symbolic value to the weapons, and a bureaucracy that sustains the nuclear triad.   The 
analysis conducts a literature review of two studies within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) community that discuss the importance of nuclear weapons and each proposes a 
nuclear triad force structure of approximately 300 nuclear warheads sufficient for U.S. 
national security and its allies and interests.  Both studies continue to rely on the nuclear 
triad structure (although smaller) and Cold War mindset without consideration of a 







     In analyzing the U.S. nuclear triad, one must look at its proponent, DoD as a 
bureaucracy that responds to the congressional-mandate, known as the Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR), the quadrennial assessment of U.S. nuclear forces and posture.  This 
analysis examines if DoD is an effective and forward-looking government agency 
regarding nuclear weapons, strategy and posture.  Or is DoD mired in bureaucratic 
stagnation?  In Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, James 
Q. Wilson discussed what a successful bureaucracy looks like:  skilled executives who 
understand the corporate mission and organization, empower subordinates with the 
authority and tasks to accomplish.  He compared the French and British armies’ 
approaches to World War II to the German army’s approach.  
     The analysis shows DoD is clinging to a “relic” of a past era and needs rethinking due 
to the fall of a bipolar world, high federal debt and budget deficits, new threats and new 
technologies and capabilities.  The analysis examines two cases of how DoD 
bureaucracies approach new technologies and innovation:  1.) electronic medical and 
dental military service member records; 2.) and digitized or electronic technical orders. 
Through this lens of the theory on bureaucracy, the analysis reviews how policies by 
Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama impact the nuclear triad and show its 
decline in importance when the Soviet Union collapsed. 
     In Chapter 2, “Affordable Tool to Fix 21st Century Threats?” the analysis examines 
five areas:  1.) significant threats to the U.S. to the 2020 timeframe; 2.) nuclear-related 
U.S. cooperative threat reduction programs with the RF and People’s Republic of China 
(PRC); 3.) ballistic missile threats; 4.) U. S. nuclear modernization and replacement 




funding and continue to pursue.  For this analysis, significant threats are those threats that 
can catastrophically reduce Americans’ confidence in the U.S. government or 
establishment institutions e.g., banks, electric/transportation grids or nuclear weapons.  
The analysis reviews the following threats to the U.S.:  cyber attacks, skyrocketing 
national debt and budget deficits, RF and PRC nuclear modernization programs.  Cyber 
attacks by a state or its proxy on the U.S. can encompass:  cyber war, terrorism, 
espionage, protest, vandalism and crime.  These forms of cyber attack are difficult to stop 
due to their asymmetry, offense and attribution.  Unfortunately, there is no national 
strategy on cyber attacks like there is for nuclear weapons.  The U.S. needs to understand 
and focus on this threat through the resources of funding and personnel.   
     Another threat to the U.S. is its skyrocketing national debt and budget deficits.  At 
$17.1 trillion, U.S. public debt has grown $5 trillion in just the last five years.  Being able 
to rise above the deep political partisanship is important because if foreign nations or 
organizations perceive the U.S is no longer the safe haven for investment may impact the 
U.S.’s ability to raise capital, devastate financial markets and impact U.S.’s ability to 
project power in the world—militarily, economically, and diplomatically. 
     The analysis reviews the nuclear modernization programs of the RF and PRC.  The RF 
is the nuclear peer to the U.S. and continues to upgrade and replace their nuclear weapon 
systems.  The PRC also has a sizeable nuclear arsenal in which it is modernizing and 
developing new strategic delivery systems.  The analysis also discusses U.S. cooperative 
threat reduction programs with RF and PRC.  The U.S. and RF have improved bilateral 
relations which include 20 years of cooperative engagement activities and investment in 




U.S. is involved with the PRC on cooperative engagement activities concerning nuclear 
security.  DoD and the Department of Energy have been working for the last three years 
with the PRC on a joint presidential-level initiative to establish a nuclear security center 
of excellence in Beijing, China.  This center will be a regional site for nations to 
participate in technical exchanges and best practices on nuclear security and nuclear non-
proliferation3wqaaw``. 
     The analysis reviews the real and growing ballistic missile threats to the U.S. and its 
allies.  During the early part of the Cold War, the ballistic missile threat to the U.S was 
one state, the Soviet Union; today, there are more than 30 countries who have acquired or 
are acquiring the shorter range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.  However, 
the two countries the U.S. is most concerned about on ballistic missiles are: North Korea 
and Iran.  The analysis then examines the U.S.’s continued modernization of its nuclear 
triad and investment in research and development (R&D) on replacement programs for its 
strategic delivery systems of ICBMs, bombers and submarines.  The analysis reviews the 
FY13 budget on nuclear-related items such as a new nuclear-capable bomber force, 
studying a follow-on system to the current ICBM and R&D on a strategic submarine 
replacement fleet scheduled to be commissioned for service in 2042.   
     Additionally, the analysis highlights the necessity to increase U.S. capabilities such as 
emerging technologies like the Air Force’s unmanned space plane and Boeing’s 
unmanned airborne system.  Lastly, the analysis reviews the top organizational position 
of U.S. Cyber Command.  The bottom line to these program and budget costs is the U.S. 
should re-focus—strategy, policies and funding priorities from a Cold War mindset to a 




the 2014-2020 timeframe of cyber attack, high national debt and budget deficits and RF’s 
and PRC’s nuclear forces modernization programs, and ballistic missile threats.   
     Finally, in Chapter 3, “Is It the Right Strategy for the 21st Century?” the analysis 
examines: 1.) Obama’s many accomplishments in the nuclear-related areas; 2.) his June 
2013 nuclear employment strategy guidance report; 3.) and critics’ op-ed article on the 
new strategy.  The analysis also presents an illustrative or notional nuclear force structure 
and posture that could be implemented immediately.   
     Concerning Obama’s accomplishments, the analysis reviews the significant progress 
on nuclear-related milestones towards the vision he stated in a speech in Prague in 2009 
of “a world without nuclear weapons.”  First, he signed the New START Treaty with the 
RF in 2010; second his administration conducted the first NPR since 2002.  The third 
accomplishment was the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), an initiative led by Obama and 
the first one conducted in April 2010.  This presidential-level forum has the goal of an 
exchange of ideas and practice to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and weapons. 
     After examining Obama’s accomplishments, the analysis reviews the recent June 2013 
U.S. nuclear employment strategy guidance report which is a follow-up to the 2010 NPR.  
DoD was the lead government agency on the report.  This nuclear strategy is 
unremarkable, bureaucratic and not transformative on U.S. nuclear policy, force structure 
and posture.   
     What would a transformative nuclear strategy look like?  The analysis offers an 
illustrative or notional nuclear force structure, strategy and posture.  First, the analysis 
looks at reducing the role of nuclear weapons from the U.S. national security strategy by: 




mission; a smaller nuclear force structure for deterrence composed of deployed ICBMs 
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and a modified posture of ICBM launch 
control centers.  Equally important to these actions would be a presidential announcement 
that precedes these actions.  The analysis offers changes to U.S. policy on the role of 
nuclear weapons and use, as well as one path in the U.S. nuclear posture to provide 
increased presidential decision-making time during a contingency.  The presidential 
announcement would be an invitation for presidents of the declared nuclear weapons 
states and other selected leaders to remain after the next NSS and dialogue on the future 
steps of multilateral nuclear arms reductions.  Obama’s 2009 Prague speech envisioning 
“a world without nuclear weapons and his accomplishments in the nuclear-related areas 
could bring great credibility to the U.S.’s transformative actions and continue to increase 
its reputation in nuclear non-proliferation.   
     This research thesis discusses the importance and influence of presidential leadership 
from Truman to Obama on the role of nuclear weapons.  As the Chief Executive Officer 
of the U.S. government, a president will have to overcome the DoD bureaucracy because 
it clings to past successful systems and is not innovative.  With the fall of the bipolar 
world in December 1991, reduced threat of global nuclear attack and limited government 
funding, the U.S. must focus on the new threats and prioritize on emerging and future 










     With the ratification of the New Start Treaty by the U.S. Senate in 2011, one can 
wonder if the treaty’s proposed incremental decline of 150 nuclear weapons from the 
previous treaty is actually just slowly kicking the can down the road.  With the People’s 
Republic of China owning $1.2 trillion dollars of U.S. Treasuries and the Russian 
Federation working cooperatively with the U.S. on securing its nuclear weapons and 
facilities, one can rightfully ask, “In 2012 and beyond, would we really use nuclear 
weapons against these countries or any future adversaries?”  In 2009, President Obama 
declared the Global Nuclear Lockdown initiative intended to assist partner nations in 
securing vulnerable nuclear materials and weapons.  Non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and materials continues to be a major U.S. and global concern.  Instead of 
periodically fostering a slightly less threatening nuclear strategy in the form of the triad, 
shouldn’t the U.S. reassess the reality and symbolism of its nuclear posture?  This chapter 
will analyze the following questions:  Has the nuclear triad outlived its usefulness? Does 
the U.S. need a Cold War strategy in the form of the nuclear triad in the 21st century?  Is 
there an alternative (s) to the triad that is appropriate for a national strategy? 
     This analysis of the nuclear triad is important because the U.S. faces serious economic 
challenges in the form of its budget deficits and national debt, so careful allocation of 
scarce resources is paramount.  However, equally important is the symbolism the U.S. 
projects by maintaining a “Cold War” apparatus as it discusses the reduction of nuclear 




proliferation and jump start long-delayed treaty discussions such as the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, if its nuclear posture could significantly be reduced.  Also investment in 
the nuclear triad is less appropriate to the current and potential future strategic contexts 
than it used to be.  The triad of U.S. nuclear forces has been maintained, since the Cold 
War, principally owing to the DoD bureaucracy clinging to a “relic” of the Cold War era.  
The thesis analysis will use the empirical method.  In examining the above questions, the 
analysis will briefly review potential explanations why the nuclear triad has lasted, 
discuss literature review of two recent analyses on nuclear forces and postures reported in 
the media; a bureaucratic explanation and two case items; brief discussion on deterrence 
and review how presidents began to deal with the staling nature of the nuclear triad; and 
finally summarize and conclude this thesis chapter. 
Possible Explanations Why the Nuclear Triad Continues 
     In analyzing the nuclear triad, one must first look to its primary proponent, 
Department of Defense (DoD, also referred to as The Pentagon) as a bureaucracy that 
responds to the congressional-mandate on an assessment of U.S. nuclear forces known as 
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  Is DoD an effective stakeholder with forward vision 
and leadership on the role of nuclear weapons as part of the national security strategy?  
Or is it stuck in predictable bureaucratic stasis and stagnation?  The analysis looks at the 
policies that impacted the nuclear triad and the decline of its importance after the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  The analysis discusses three potential reasons the nuclear triad 
continues to last:  1.) deterrence is still important; 2.) symbolic value to the weapons; and 
3.) a bureaucracy that sustains the nuclear triad.  The analysis conducts a literature review 




importance of nuclear weapons and each proposes a nuclear triad force structure of 
approximately 300 nuclear warheads as sufficient for U.S. national security and its allies 
and interests.   
Literature Review. 
     Recently, news media reports have identified the National Security Council (NSC) 
and The Pentagon as performing analyses of three options of strategic deployed nuclear 
warheads ranging from 300 to 400, 700 to 800 and 1000 to 1,100.   According to a New 
York Times editorial, the three options would be part of the next round of arms reduction 
talks with the Russians.  The editorial cites Senate Republicans as outraged by a potential 
drastic reduction in the nuclear arsenal.  However, the editorial mentioned Senator Tom 
Coburn, known as “Dr. No” (he’s a medical doctor) because of his reluctance to increase 
government spending, as “one of the few Republicans who argue that the country does 
not need and cannot afford its huge arsenal. He has come up with a plan to save $79 
billion over the next 10 years, including reducing the number of deployed strategic 
warheads to 1,220.”5 
     The Associated Press (AP) also reported Obama asked the NSC and The Pentagon to 
formulate similar option alternatives.  The AP cited two studies in the DoD community 
that looked at a nuclear arsenal of about 300.6  The first study termed as a “Working 
Paper” authored by an analyst for the RAND National Defense Research Institute who 











authors associated with the Air Force discuss deterrence and an appropriate size for the 
nuclear triad.  The analysis will briefly examine both articles and discuss how the 
approach and conclusions they reach still cling to Cold War thinking, not forward-
looking for the U.S. to implement. 
      In “Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions About Nuclear Forces and 
Postures” by Paul K. Davis who states the paper is a “think piece” and intends to describe 
a potential analytic framework to assist executive-level decision-making on the role of 
nuclear weapons.  In essence, the author perpetuates a Cold War approach in formulating 
nuclear force structures on such issues as options for limited use of nuclear weapons 
against the failing leader of a rogue state.  Davis lists nine generic features which he 
believes are good to support strategic-level decisions.  He rightfully points out that 
“Developing good options is notoriously difficult because organizations often put forth 
only options reflecting current practices or desires.”7 In the next section, the author 
develops two listings called “stances” which he believes are the primary discussion issues 
of nuclear strategy and policy.  “Stance 1,” later “Perspective 1” in his model, represents 
a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-optimistic leaning while the second stance 
titled “Perspective 2” represents the skeptics’ approach.   Both of these listings will be 
incorporated into the taxonomy of objectives and enablers and ultimately a summary of 
the options assessment on nuclear forces, policy and other related deterrence issues like 










eventually be the author’s foundation for the prototype roll-up assessment, are 
disappointing because he uses pejorative terms and phrases to describe nuclear weapons’ 
past deterrent value and effectiveness of previous arms control agreements as well as a 
lack of incorporation of current and future technologies and capabilities.  For example, in 
Stance 1 the author lists that nuclear weapons are useless or unnecessary except for 
deterring nuclear weapons states and also nuclear stability is weak.  While in Stance 2, 
the author states deterrence is “complicated” and requires thousands of nuclear weapons 
against rogue actors and states.  Additionally, the author lists the effectiveness of arms 
control verification mechanisms for significantly low numbers of nuclear weapons.    
These types of assumptions keep the discussion on the numbers of nuclear weapons in a 
Cold War mindset.    
     Finally, Davis presents his notional summary of option assessment which has six 
options including a 300 nuclear weapon force structure.  He scored (using 0 to 1) the 
effectiveness of each option by Perspectives 1 and 2 and then weighs them against 
various other criteria.  However, as stated earlier the entering assumptions were Cold 
War vintage.  Davis concludes his discussion by stating his assessments as purely 
notional and “intended to illustrate what results of analysis might look like.”8   
     The second article in which the media stated DoD was assessing how to significantly 
reduce nuclear weapons is “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of 
Nuclear Weapons”9.  The authors begin the article with a quote from Bernard Brodie:  








although all outcomes would be bad, some would be very much worse than others.”10 The 
authors could have also used a different quote from that same Brodie book to show his 
concern about atomic bombs:  “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment 
has been to win wars.  From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.  It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.”11  By the title of the article and use of a quote by James 
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the 2008 Task Force on DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Management the authors infer that nuclear weapons’ deterrent value 
has not declined.    
     The authors believe the nuclear triad should be perpetuated well into the 21st century.  
They state such phrases as:  “Policy makers have forgotten the value of nuclear 
weapons”; “they produce strategic effects”; and “in short, nuclear weapons deter.”  
Against who?  Nuclear weapons may deter other nuclear weapons states but not suicidal 
terrorists and rogue states seeking an indigenous nuclear weapons capability to further 
their aims.  According to Franklin C. Miller, “nuclear weapons are not and never were 
intended to be, all-purpose deterrents.  It would not be credible, for example to threaten 
nuclear retaliation in response to a proxy war in some foreign country, a lamentable but 














     The authors again use a quote from the Schlesinger Task Force which investigated and 
reported on the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise management after a series of accidents in 
2007 came to light: “Though our consistent goal has been to avoid actual weapons use, 
the nuclear deterrent is ‘used’ every day” by the U.S. to assure allies, dissuade opponents, 
deter attacks and defeat enemies.13  Actually, what the phrase refers to are the daily 
requirements to maintain the nuclear triad:  security forces guard and secure the ICBM 
launch facilities, the maintenance personnel repair to ensure the weapon is ready, and 
missile officers are trained to be proficient in processing authentic and valid presidential 
orders to launch ICBMs, if directed.  So, the word ‘used’ is an attempt to show the 
timeless value of the triad when in fact, the phrase is really incongruent to the real and 
devastating consequences nuclear weapons would have on people, culture and 
civilization if ever used again.   
     The authors correctly states some conventional weapons can approach the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons but “a certain symbolism has come to be attached to 
nuclear weapons that has historically enhanced their clarifying quality and induced 
caution in national decision makers.”  It’s interesting the authors cited this reference to 
Nina Tannenwald because her thesis was within the global community, there’s been the 
development against the use (actual launching of them, not as a threat or deterrent) of 
nuclear weapons.  In her article, she states this explains nuclear weapons’ non-use and 







war.14  The catastrophic effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have left an indelible mark on 
American presidents such that at pivotal points of U.S. military conflicts in Korea, Cuba, 
Vietnam, and Iraq, they chose not to use a nuclear weapon. 
     Finally, the authors propose their version of a nuclear triad framework.  They state the 
real question to be asked is, “What size force is needed for deterrence?”  They identified 
and explained how 311 nuclear weapons of the triad (ICBMs, SLBMs and B-2s) could be 
an effective deterrent strategy.  They conclude that reducing the numbers within the 
nuclear triad would be enough to ensure U.S. security.  Although very commendable to 
significantly reduce nuclear weapons to just over 300, the authors did not address what 
the vision for a new U.S. national security strategy would look like after the reduction of 
nuclear weapons.  What role would new technologies like ballistic missile defenses, 
cyber, drones, and new concepts of operation for Special Forces in place of the reduced 
nuclear triad?   However, just shrinking the numbers of nuclear weapons would still leave 
unresolved the focus and continued sustainment and procurement of replacement systems 










     Theory 
     Whereas bureaucracies are noted for their conservative postures toward change, this is 
all more the case when one considers bureaucracies that are generally successful in 
meeting their strategic aims.15  Comparing the French and British armies’ approaches to 
World War II to the German army’s approach, James Q. Wilson argued that French and 
British success in WWI led to stability, perhaps stagnation, whereas the German army—
because of its loss—was more prone to change.  According to Wilson, a successful 
bureaucracy had “skilled executives, who correctly identified the critical tasks of their 
organization, distributed authority in a way appropriate to those tasks, infused their 
subordinates with a sense of mission, and acquired sufficient autonomy to permit them to 
get on with the job.”16  By contrast, the framework of the nuclear triad was successful in 
the Cold War, helping bring down the Soviet Union.  With the nuclear enterprise 
infrastructure and triad still in place and receiving funding and resources, the stagnation 
of the successful may have set in.  Two cases below continue to show the DoD will mire 
in the status quo and unlikely to lead and identify the critical tasks and provide the sense 
of mission as Wilson’s theory suggests, for a new nuclear weapons force framework. 
Case 1 
     The bureaucratic stagnation explanation of the persistence of the nuclear triad is 
consistent with the way that bureaucracy of DoD agencies approach new technologies 








bureaucracies are all too willing to cling to the past ways of doing business instead of 
forward-looking.  Digitization has been a clarion call by U.S. presidents for the past 
twenty years as a rally to steer our nation in investing and utilizing the latest technologies 
of this new age of  information technology (IT).  In 1998, Clinton had called on DoD and 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop a life-long medical record for 
service members.  Bush signed Executive Order 13410 on August 22, 2006 directing 
federal agencies to promote quality and efficient health care within government-
sponsored programs to include developing interoperable systems to exchange medical 
data information.  The implementation date was January 1, 2007.17  And now Obama has 
also called upon for an integrated, streamlined electronic health records system for 
service members and veterans.  Unfortunately, an active-duty service member in DoD 
who serves 20+ years of honorable service, retires today and becomes a veteran does not 
have access to a seamless, electronic medical record.18     
     It’s important to have one life-long virtual, computerized record because it:  1.) 
reduces costs to the American taxpayer; 2.) ensures high quality medical care (all the data 
is in a single location); 3.) avoids errors by ensuring timeliness of the information (e.g. 
VA doctors caring for medically-discharged service members due to traumatic combat 
injuries can immediately diagnose and treat); 4.) assures delivery of patient information is 
secure—no more lost paper records or forgotten copies at home; and 5.) streamlines the 











        On May 8, 2007, Congress received another update on DoD’s and VA’s progress 
toward an interoperable electronic medical record system from testimony given by 
Valerie Melvin, Government Accountability Office (GAO) Director of Human Capital 
and Management Information Systems, to the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee of Veterans’ Affairs, House of Representatives. Based 
on GAO’s findings, Melvin stated that despite a couple of small steps in computable 
exchange of pharmacy and allergy data and two-way bidirectional exchange of some 
categories of health data, DoD and VA hadn’t made much progress toward a seamless 
electronic heath record system.19  Committee members were flabbergasted by the lack of 
significant movement toward completion.  When asked by the congressional members on 
the estimated time of completion, neither Melvin nor the next witnesses of assistant 
secretaries of DoD and VA could provide an answer.  When pressed by the chairman of 
the subcommittee of a five-year completion date, the witnesses thought it might be 
possible. 
     The committee members pressed the director for her insights on why DoD and VA 
were dragging their feet on a seamless electronic heath record system.  Melvin responded 
that both departments recognize the importance of the project but their organizational 
cultures were hard to overcome; DoD had many systems to manage and were 
modernizing them.  Melvin testified the primary reasons for the delay was the lack of an 











director’s observations are important because strategy, project plan and collaboration 
documents and efforts require endorsement or signature from a departmental senior-level 
principal, such as an assistant secretary or deputy secretary.  The congressional testimony 
indicates the seamless electronic health record system may not have the buy-in from 
DoD’s skilled executives to break down paradigms, so the working-level managers seeks 
occasional coordination and guidance from senior leaders.  In the latest report on 
electronic health records, GAO identified DoD and VA as having barriers in key IT 
management areas—strategic planning, enterprise architecture and investment 
management.21  These are the same type of shortfalls the GAO director testified to 
congress five years earlier.   
     According to Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, one consideration about 
government bureaucracy:  “…the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating 
decision maker, but rather a conglomerate of larger organizations and political actors who 
differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and 
who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their 
government.”22 
     As with the DoD’s life-long electronic medical health record system, the next case 
item will also show that DoD struggles to provide the vision, leadership and innovation 














     Like the medical and dental records of a service member turned veteran, ICBM 
missile officer crews (missileers) are still issued and use paper technical orders (TO) or 
user manuals to operate and troubleshoot procedures dealing with the missile and the 
multiple communication systems under their charge.  As background, there are about 200 
missileers assigned to each of the three Air Force missile wings.  Each missileer has a TO 
for missile operations and another one for the communication systems at their duty 
location in the missile field called the launch control center (LCC); each TO is 
approximately 400 pages.  In all, the crew force possesses about 600 TOs for the 
Minuteman III operations and 600 for the communication systems that support the ICBM 
mission.  However, in addition to the missileers, the following agencies also possess 
paper TOs:  the missile wing’s supervising element, 20th Air Force who manages, 
oversees and evaluates ICBM operations and maintenance, the Air Force Systems 
Program Office (SPO) as well as the prime contractor supporting and advising the SPO.  
So, another 200 paper TOs are issued.  Consider, within the command and control 
console in the LCC which the missile crew operates, there is resident within the software 
an electronic data library and electronic TO checklists mirroring paper TOs.  Why does 
the Air Force still publish paper user manuals for ICBM operations when an electronic 
version exists now?   The predominant leadership response to that question has been 
because crews have always used their paper TOs.  Recently, in discussing this issue with 
two senior Air Force technical experts, both responded that the Air Force has no 
confidence in the currency of the electronic TO checklists—a new procedure or 




LCC electronic data library computer.  It’s easier for the SPO to update the procedural 
change and issue the paper TO page.  However, why can’t the Air Force use the current 
technology that was intended for on missile operations?  And if there is a concern on 
currency, why not have crews remotely download the TO change into the electronic data 
library?  By using paper TOs that missileers must manage and carry around, the Air 
Force continues to spend precious American taxpayer dollars when there is an existing 
(and paperless) electronic and secure capability.   
      
The Triad in its Time  
     When President Harry S. Truman ordered the crews of the “Enola Gay” and “Bock’s 
Car,” B-29 bombers from the Army Air Force’s Twentieth Air Force23 to drop two 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. became the only superpower in the 
world.  With Pearl Harbor seared into the American psyche, national leaders sought to 
ensure its survivability in the new nuclear age; the nuclear age had created more 
unknown variables to a nation’s calculus on potential benefits versus costs in a war 
against the U.S or any other nuclear weapon power:  the risk of mass annihilation of its 
people, culture and civilization.  Bernard Brodie, the godfather of nuclear deterrence 










for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of 
attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.”24   
Deterrence. 
    The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which started during the Cold 
War, helped keep the U.S. and the Soviet Union from nuclear annihilation.  The U.S. 
nuclear triad was born out of this strategy.  In this doctrine, each side presumes to have 
enough nuclear weapons to launch at and destroy the other side.  And that either side, if 
attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater devastation. 
The potential result is an immediate escalation of nuclear detonations which would result 
in both country’s mutual, absolute and assured destruction of its people and civilization. 
   The doctrine further assumes that each side is “deterred” by the other side—since 
neither will dare launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning a 
counter attack (a second strike), resulting in catastrophic losses for both countries.   
According to Franklin C. Miller, “The simple fact is that deterrence is highly complex 
and rests on convincing any potential aggressor that the devastation created by our 
retaliation would far outweigh the benefits of any aggression, so that attacking us or allies 
becomes unthinkable.”25  Over twenty years earlier, the complexity of nuclear deterrence 
was noted.  In an article that discussed a series of propositions on deterrence, Colin Gray 
stated on the requirements of deterrence and the nuclear triad:  “The US strategic nuclear 










deterred.  In a deterrence relationship, intended deterrees can always decide that they are 
not deterred, a situation which contrasts sharply with a relationship of physical coercion 
wherein the enemy’s behavior is controlled by our forces.”26  Gray summarized this 
proposition on the requirements of deterrence by stating:  “…an adequate deterrent, let 
alone an enduring condition of stable deterrence, cannot be calculated with precision.  
Deterrence is a realm of educated guesswork.  Scholars talk of the ‘calculus’ of 
deterrence and of ‘risk/benefit analysis,’ but those are just overblown figures of 
speech.”27  This proposition is important to remember and consider as the analysis 
discusses an illustrative or notional transformative nuclear strategy, posture and force 
structure in Chapter 3.   
     The first delivery system of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was the bomber aircraft, B-29 
which also was the first system to be replaced at the beginning of the Cold War.  
The Bombers. 
The bomber element has unique characteristics—it demonstrates a visible (e.g. loading of 
bombs, taxiing, and take off) resolve of will during times of crisis; since it is a manned, it 
is also recallable.  This characteristic can provide a president with flexibility, and also 
allows time to reconsider the attack plan or an adversary may sue for peace.  The 
workhorse of the triad, the B-52 Stratofortress came into the military service in 1955, and 
still is a long-range and strategic capable bomber that could carry a vast array of nuclear 
and conventional munitions; it has the ability to fly 7,652 nautical miles unrefueled (can 









since it was bomber aircraft, the B-29 that dropped the first two atomic bombs.  Of 
course, over the last sixty years, the Department of Defense has invested billions of 
dollars in modernization programs on the B-52’s avionics, data-link communications 
systems, and offensive and defensive systems. The Air Force estimates the service life of 
the B-52 will extend to 2040.29  The intended replacement to the B-52 was the B-1, a 
long range, multi-mission bomber that the Air Force began development in the 1970’s, 
and in 1977, President Jimmy Carter cancelled the program.  As part of President 
Reagan’s pledge to rebuild the U.S. defense infrastructure, the B-1 program was 
resurrected and the first bomber began military service in 1985.  It carries the largest 
payload of both guided and unguided munitions in the Air Force inventory.30  The most 
revolutionary (the “bat” wing design) of the bomber aircraft, the B-2 Spirit is capable of 
delivering nuclear and conventional weapons, and because of its low-observable, or 
"stealth" characteristics has the unique ability to penetrate an enemy's most sophisticated 
defenses and threaten its heavily defended targets.31  Twenty B-2s were manufactured for 
the Air Force. 
ICBMs. 
     During the 1950’s, the Air Force developed and deployed a new weapon system, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), the first ones, Atlas and Titan systems.  These 
early ICBMs were stored vertically below ground and raised to be fueled with liquid 
propellant for launch.  The Atlas ICBMs became operational on October 31, 1959 and at 








then used in the National Aeronautical Space Administration’s (NASA) Space Program.  
The Titan missile (a total of 54 Titan ICBMS were deployed) was developed as a backup 
to the Atlas program; the Air Force developed two versions, Titan I which was 
operationally deployed around the U.S. from 1962-1965, and the more advanced Titan II 
deployed from 1963-1987.32   
     A revolutionary concept and technological achievement was achieved as discussed 
earlier, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the deployment of the next generation 
ICBM, the Minuteman I.  By 1968, 1000 Minutemen would be deployed in the northern 
and central plains.  It was the first solid propellant ICBM that could stand dormant in 
hardened underground silos for years, while being remotely controlled by missile officer 
crews in underground launch control centers miles away.  The current version, 
Minuteman III is the only ICBM in the U.S. nuclear triad; it is a fast-reacting, inertially 
guided system with high reliability and a maintenance “remove and replace” approach to 
achieve a near 100 per cent alert rate.33  The Air Force has funded significant 
modernization programs for the Minuteman III such as guidance replacement and solid 
propellant replacement which will keep the ICBM in service through 2030.  The ICBM’s 
unique value to the nuclear triad is its prompt-response capability, high alert rates, and 
high reliability factors. 
Submarines. 
     The final leg of the triad is the fleet ballistic missile submarine known as “SSBNs” or 








platform for ICBMs referred to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  
Compared to the other two elements of the triad, the SLBM force is the most survivable 
and enduring. The Navy began deploying the first of the SSBNs in the early 1960’s, with 
the current version known as Ohio-class design (560 feet long and 16, 764 tons 
displacement-surfaced) which was deployed in 1981.  With 14 total ships, each SSBN is 
capable of carrying up to 24 Trident II missiles with intercontinental range and 
accuracy.34  And like the Minuteman force, the Trident II missiles have multiple-
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)—the DoD planners could have the 
nuclear warheads (from the same missile) deploy and detonate on different locations.     
     The nuclear triad was developed in the context of the Cold War and the evolution of 
the nuclear triad mirrors how the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union, later Russian Federation 
(RF) and, ultimately, the U.S.’s understanding of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War 
era and the-9/11 attacks.  With the variety and dispersal of delivery platforms mentioned 
above, the U.S. forged the capabilities to communicate the strategic message to other 
nations that it could not be defeated in one fell swoop of nuclear weapons.  Over the 
decades, the U.S.’s enormous investments in the three legs of the triad through 
modernization programs, improving accuracies and incorporating new technologies 
provided stability by assuring the nation, allies and friends and warning its adversaries 
(mostly Soviet Union) that the U.S. possessed the means to confidently retaliate an 
aggressor’s attack.  The Soviets had a clear conventional forces advantage over the U.S. 







sense for the U.S.  This strategy ensured the Soviet Union thought twice about attacking 
the U.S. or its interests or to escalate hostilities that could get out of control.   
The Weakening of the Triad 
     During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the nuclear triad began to show its age with 
nuclear modernization programs and funding coming to a halt.  President Jimmy Carter 
had canceled the B-1 bomber program, the current Minuteman III ICBMs were not being 
modernized and the latest ICBM, the MX (Missile Experimental), later named 
Peacekeeper, was on DoD program “life-support”.  With President Reagan’s election in 
1980, his administration sought to reverse the Soviet lead in strategic forces by a “Peace 
through Strength” buildup to counter a decade which saw a 20% decline in defense 
efforts in the face of a 50% increase in Soviet military strength.35 The Air Force started 
up the B-1 bomber production line and became operational while the Minuteman III 
(which originally had an operational life span of five years) underwent the first set of 
modernization programs.  After studies and debates of basing modes and the appropriate 
number of missiles, the Air Force deployed 50 (down from the original 300) Peacekeeper 
ICBMs into former Minuteman ICBM hardened underground silos near Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  The Peacekeeper ICBM was huge—its first booster rocket stage (out of four) 
was heavier than the entire Minuteman III ICBM; it could carry and deploy 10 nuclear 
warheads at different targets with near pinpoint accuracy.  The Peacekeeper, along with 
the B-1 symbolized the Reagan Administration’s resolve to close the strategic gap with 








     Reviewing the major changes of U.S. defense strategy and policy over the five years 
as Secretary of Defense to Ronald Reagan, Caspar Weinberger stated the essence for the 
buildup which would last through the mid-1990’s:  “The President’s determination to 
ensure that a nuclear war will never be fought is the mandate for our defense program and 
arms reduction initiatives. Our goal can be stated simply: to ensure that the defense of 
America’s vital interests never requires the United States to fight a nuclear war.”36  In this 
article, Weinberger was prescient on today’s strategic environment, especially in robust 
conventional forces and new technologies.  He addressed four enduring pillars of defense 
policy for the changing strategic environment: the Strategic Defense Initiative (e.g. a 
ballistic missile defense system against incoming nuclear weapons) and secure nuclear 
deterrence; uses of military force and secure conventional deterrence; and a strategy for 
reduction and controlling arms; and competitive strategies (e.g. stealth technologies to 
operate or penetrate an adversaries defenses without being detected). 37  These pillars will 
be a common theme of future U.S. nuclear policies formally known as “Nuclear Posture 
Review” (NPR) report—first one conducted by DoD in 1994—is the bottom-up review of 
U.S. nuclear forces, policy, and doctrine, supporting infrastructure, security, safety and 
arms control.  The NPR is a legislatively-mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear 
policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next five to ten years. 
       On September 18, 1994, President William J. Clinton signed a far-reaching NPR 
report that outlined U.S. policy on nuclear weapons, the first since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991.  There were five basic themes:  1.) nuclear weapons 







U.S. requires a much smaller nuclear arsenal given the current global situation; 3.) there 
is great uncertainty about which direction the New Independent States (former Soviet 
Union states) would shift given that a few were in the process of denuclearization, so the 
U.S. “must provide a hedge against this uncertainty”38—read triad; 4.) U.S.’s nuclear 
deterrent is both a national and international nuclear posture; 5.) continue the highest 
standards of safety and security of nuclear weapons, materials and command and control.  
The NPR identified Russia as the focus of the U.S. because it had the only nuclear arsenal 
which could physically destroy the U.S.39  According to the document, the primary 
reason to retain a triad:  “Hedging against system failure of a leg of a triad—either 
because of technical failure of a delivery platform or warhead or technological 
breakthroughs by potential adversaries.”40  Briefly, there are key takeaways from the 
NPR to highlight the U.S.’s commitment to drastically reduce it nuclear forces.  As part 
of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I (signed on July 31, 1991), President 
George H.W. Bush announced on September 27, 1991 that the U.S. would be making 
significant changes to its nuclear posture.  On September 28, 1991, the Secretary of 
Defense directed the Air Force to remove strategic bombers from day-to-day nuclear alert 
and Minuteman II ICBMs were removed from the strategic war plan.   
      Additionally, the Small ICBM which at the time was being considered for 
deployment was cancelled, the B-1 bomber was converted to conventional-only missions, 










instead target open ocean areas.  Finally, the NPR noted U.S. spending on strategic 
forces, in constant 1994 dollars was $13.5 billion in 1994 down from $47.8 billion in 
1984.  The document reiterated under START I and START II (which was never ratified 
by the Senate) both the U.S. and Russia would retain 3,500 warheads deployed on 
strategic launch delivery systems.41 The 1994 NPR was a seminal document because it 
addressed the significant changes in the security environment facing the U.S., and the 
need for a smaller, modernized nuclear arsenal going forward in the post-Cold War 
world.  As backdrop to this the U.S. and RF had recently signed a treaty drastically 
reducing nuclear warheads in January 3, 1993. 
     In contrast to the seminal 1994 report, the 2002 NPR was transformational.  With the 
clean-up still progressing in The Pentagon after terrorists hijacked and crashed American 
Airlines Flight 77 on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush directed DoD to 
prepare for a new, unpredictable world.  The NPR report (classified report, unclassified 
“Foreword” referenced) was signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 
January 9, 2002.  The major change in the role of the nuclear triad was not only the 
reduction in forces but also less emphasis in the U.S.’s deterrent strategy.  The Bush 
Administration had changed from a “threat-based” Cold War focus on a smaller Russian 
nuclear force to one of “capabilities-based” approach concentrated against terrorists and 
rogue state actors.  The report established a “New Triad” composed of offensive strike 
systems (both nuclear and conventional/information operations); active and passive 
defenses e.g. ballistic missile defense systems and space warning satellite systems; and 






All these capabilities would be enabled by intelligence systems and command and 
control.42 Pictorially, one could view the “old” nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and 
bombers as a small triangle within the larger “New Triad” triangle described above.  The 
Bush Administration believed the nuclear triad was a holdover from the Cold War period 
and inappropriate to posture, deter and defeat terrorists who would use airplanes filled 
with people as weapons of mass destruction and crash them into iconic American 
buildings.  In the foreword, Rumsfeld recognized the changed strategic landscape in 
terms of threats and economics: “Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed 
nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource 
implications.  It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new 
capabilities.”43  Rumsfeld was a strong proponent to address the new ballistic missile 
threats having chaired the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. 
just three years earlier.   The ominous conclusions of the Commission appear to have 
influenced Bush and Rumsfeld to restructure ballistic missile and intelligence capabilities 
and address in the New Triad:  “The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities 
will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be 
able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to 
acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the 











     As a backdrop to the NPR, Bush had announced on November 13, 2001 that the U.S. 
would deploy (position) 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
bombers—significantly down from the START I figures of 3,500 mentioned earlier.  
Bush later signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) with President Putin 
of the Russian Federation to codify the agreement. This announcement would be 
buttressed by Bush’s declaration the next month, December 2001 that the U.S. intended 
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months and giving advanced notice as 
prescribed by the treaty.     
     In April 2010, DoD highlighted the new NPR report supports Obama’s agenda for 
reducing nuclear danger, pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while 
also advancing broader U.S. security interests.  In this report, DoD focused on five key 
nuclear policy objectives:  “1.) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 2.) 
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 3.) Maintaining 
strategic deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; 4.) Strengthening regional 
deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 5.) Sustaining a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal.”45  The significant takeaways from the report:  the top policy 
objective was preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, the second objective 
was to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy, and the fifth 
and final objective was to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. A repeated 
theme throughout the report: “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must 








to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they count on America’s security 
commitments.”46 In other words, if the nuclear weapons are around, then the U.S. will do 
the right thing as a caretaker.  Two other key points have to do with the release of nuclear 
weapons:  the U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 
circumstances to defend its vital interests or its allies and partners; and the U.S. would 
not use or threaten use against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and complying with non-proliferation obligations.47   
     This report also reiterated the Bush NPR observation that the massive nuclear arsenal 
carried over from the Cold War does not deter terrorists or rogue states seeking to acquire 
nuclear weapons.  The NPR identified a logical argument for the reduced reliance on 
nuclear weapons:  the U.S.’s unrivaled conventional military capabilities, vast 
improvements in its ballistic missile defenses (there are now ballistic missile interceptors 
in silos in Alaska and California to shield the continental U.S. from future threats from 
North Korea and Iran), and the overall easing of Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and 
the Russian Federation.48  Additional key points concern stability during a nuclear crisis.  
The report continued with the Bush Administration NPR’s recommendation for ICBMs 
to have a single nuclear warhead, not multiple ones which would be de-stabilizing 
because of a first-strike capability.  An entirely new discussion emerged as well:  the 
president wanted maximum decision time in the event of a crisis so strengthening the 
command and control system was a priority as well as the exploration of new modes of 









Administration, a published NPR came after an agreed upon nuclear weapons reduction 
treaty with the RF.  President Obama and President Medvedev signed the “New START 
Treaty” on April 8, 2010 (Senate ratification on February 2, 2011) which limits deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) to 1,550—“This limit is 
74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty”50 and 10% lower than the lower 
range (1,700) of the 2002 SORT treaty.  There is no constraint on missile defense 
programs or long-range strike capabilities.51 
     What happened?  After delivering a visionary speech on April 5, 2009 in Prague 
outlining the dangers of nuclear terrorism in the 21st century and seeking the long-term 
goal of a world without nuclear weapons, President Obama agreed to reduce nuclear 
weapons by only 150 from the previous treaty!  Why such a small reduction when the 
voluminous 50-page NPR had significant ideas to shift the U.S.’s strategic deterrence 
from nuclear-centric to one that is non-nuclear or conventional and information 
operations?  Was it the politics of seeking Republican senators’ “advise and consent” for 
treaty ratification?  Possibly.  Was DoD worried about ensuring coverage of strategic 
targets and threats in Russia?  Probably.  This seemingly status quo nuclear posture, 
albeit with talking points of change around the margins may have left a bad taste in the 
mouth of the Obama Administration. 











     Obama is correct that the long-term goal of the U.S. and the world should be the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons.  Until that time and given the RF’s and PRC’s 
nuclear arsenals as well as other nuclear weapons state’s nuclear arsenals, U.S.’s 
comparative advantages in technologies such as stealth aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and capabilities such as Special 
Forces, the U.S. should retain a much smaller portion of its current nuclear force 
structure.  However, before just shrinking the number of nuclear weapons within the 
nuclear triad, the U.S. must perform a “clean sheet” approach on its deterrent strategy as 
part of an update to the 2010 National Security Strategy.  As a bureaucracy, DoD clings 
to systems and frameworks like the nuclear triad that have successfully worked in the 
past and continue to perpetuate in the present.  As discussed earlier, the U.S. nuclear triad 
was a viable force during and winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union.   
     When did the nuclear triad outlive its usefulness and sustained the Cold War?  I offer  
October 12, 1986 when Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the 
Reykjavik, Iceland Summit proposed to eliminate all ballistic missiles.  They would have 
agreed to this if the Soviets hadn’t also conditioned the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
remain a research effort, not a test and evaluation and deployment program.  Reagan 
refused this condition and the nuclear triad continued to exist.52 
     Chapter 2 should look at the significant threats and challenges the U.S. faces to the 









2013, the multipolar world includes the increase of proliferation of nuclear weapons 
among more nations.  Also, the “Great Recession” of 2009 caused turmoil in financial 
markets and the U.S. economy setting up future congressional conflicts with the White 




CHAPTER 2:  Affordable Tool to Fix 21st Century Threats? 
 
Introduction 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, Reagan and Gorbachev were on the verge of signing each 
country’s nuclear forces into oblivion if it were not for the Soviet condition on laboratory 
research—no test and evaluation and deployment—of new technologies of missile  
defense, SDI.  If the two presidents were so willing to sign away nuclear force structures 
in 1986 only to see the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union and evaporation of the 
bipolar world five years later, shouldn’t the U.S. conduct a clean sheet assessment of the 
significant threats facing it today?    
      With the U.S. no longer facing heighten tensions that could eminently result in a 
global nuclear attack, and its nuclear triad forces requiring replacement systems to 
function for the remainder of the 21st century, the U.S. should seriously consider its 
national security policy and the role and expense of nuclear weapons and the new threats.  
The analysis will examine the following questions:  What are these significant threats the 
U.S. faces and is the nuclear triad the right tool to meet those threats?  Given the nuclear 
use taboo discussed in Chapter 1 and due to the diminished nuclear threat to the U.S., the 
U.S. should reduce its investments in nuclear weapons systems, address growing and 
current threats, and invest in other, emerging, defense technologies.  
     This analysis is important because the threats to U.S.’s national security from 2014 to 
2020 are different than the threat of global nuclear war in the 20th century.  The U.S. 
needs to address these threats or the impacts to the U.S. economy and military and future 
technologies and capabilities in projecting American power will be profound.  In 




U.S:  cyber attack; high national debt and budgets as well as review the RF’s and PRC’s 
nuclear threat to the U.S. and the current cooperation engagement activities; ballistic 
missile threats; highlight the modernizing costs of the nuclear triad; analyze current and 
new technologies and capabilities and their future; and finally, summarize and conclude 
this thesis chapter. 
Threats 
     Today, the U.S. faces many threats and challenges such as the slower than usual 
economic recovery from the “Great Recession” and residual high unemployment, Euro 
zone’s sovereign debt crises, transnational organized crime groups, and border control 
and illegal immigration.  Additionally, Iran’s pursuit of an indigenous capability to 
produce highly enriched uranium which it claims would be used for electricity and 
medical reactor use (disputed by the U.S. and the West who argue the program is for a 
nuclear weapons capability) and North Korea’s estimated six to eight nuclear bombs53 
like the others are threats that could pose serious risk to the U.S.  However, Iran does not 
have a nuclear arsenal yet and North Korea does not have a credible and robust missile 
system to deliver the limited nuclear weapons.  The analysis will discuss the significant 
threats facing the U.S.’s national security:  cyber attack, high national debt and budget 











     Cyber attack is the newest form of attack a nation or its proxy wages on its 
adversaries.  From the cyber attacks (purportedly by Russian hackers) on Estonia’s 
government networks in 2007 and Georgia’s in 2008, Chinese hackers stealing 
intellectual property and spying on Google’s email users in 2010, a formidable weapon 
for national power has evolved.  Cyber attack encompasses cyber war, terrorism, 
espionage, protest, vandalism and crime, and “possesses characteristics unique to the 
digital world:  asymmetry, offense and attribution.”54  Regarding asymmetry, low-cost 
resources such as one person(s) with a computer(s), access to the Internet and hacking 
knowledge can attack a high-value target like a government network or bank financial 
database.  Since the web is collaborative in nature, openness is prized over strict security 
and defensive measures such as a closed network or common access card use.  This 
openness allows hacker(s) to strike first, and because it’s difficult to attribute the hacker’s 
actions, the maliciousness remains essentially anonymous and hard to track.55  
     A watershed event for the U.S and DoD was the compromise in 2008 of its classified 
military network.  “A foreign intelligence agency was responsible for placing a malicious 
computer code on a flash drive that was inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in 
the Middle East.  That code spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems 












incident, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established a new military command, U.S. 
Cyber Command (reporting to U.S Strategic Command) led by a four-star general who 
would oversee and coordinate each of the military service’s day-to-day cyber efforts in 
defending DoD networks (.mil domains) and work with other U.S. interagency partners 
such as the Department of Homeland Security and Justice Department.   DoD continued 
to recognize the importance of cyber attack in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review—a 
congressionally-mandated review of DoD’s strategy, programs and resources as it aligns 
to the National Security Strategy—“cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD 
activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.”57 
     Upon assuming office, Obama understood the critical nature of cyber attack, and 
continued with Bush’s National Cybersecurity Initiative and ordered a Cyberspace Policy 
Review, similar to a Nuclear Posture Review discussed in Chapter 1.  Obama has already 
implemented a couple of the review’s recommendations:  established a U.S. 
Cybersecurity Coordinator who would have access to the president and coordinate the 
Executive Branch’s cyber efforts and implement the Cyberspace Policy Review 
recommendations through the newly created Cybersecurity Office.  Unlike a national 
strategy on nuclear weapons, there is still no overarching national strategy on 
cyberattacks that discusses the nature of threats, programs, roles and responsibilities and 
declaratory responses.  The lack of a national strategy is disconcerting because the 2008 
compromise was not the only successful penetration.  By not having a national strategy 
on how to handle cyber attacks’ potentially catastrophic consequences, leaves the U.S. 







times and scanned millions of times…Adversaries have acquired thousands of files from 
U.S. networks and from the networks of U.S. allies and industry partners, including 
weapons blueprints, operational plans and surveillance data.”58    
     On February 12, 2013, Obama issued an executive order directing federal agencies to 
develop a framework for combating cyberattacks on critical public and private 
infrastructures59 and increase the amount of information that is shared about threats.  In 
the president’s budget for fiscal year 2014 he allots more than $13 billion to cyber 
programs, nearly 16 percent of a federal IT budget totaling about $82 billion.   
     The espionage and stealing of U.S. intellectual property will eventually impact our 
nation’s technological and patent competitive advantage in the global economy.  So far, 
the dozens of nations who have set up cyber units and proxies have not taken the next 
step: physical attack on the U.S and its citizens.        
     Given the asymmetry, offense and anonymity characteristics of cyber attacks, it may 
be only a matter of time when an entity(s) will infiltrate U.S. computer networks 
controlling air traffic, power grids, water treatment plants and bank accounts and wreak 
havoc on Americans:  airplanes crashing into one another; water treatment plants not 
performing filtration and disinfectant; transfer of monies out of bank accounts and 
inoperable ATM and credit card machines. 
     A hostile nation or extremist group could inflict the most destructive cyber attacks by 
overloading the system with several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in 









degrade critical military systems and command, control and communication (C3) 
networks.  According to then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, “The collective result 
of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause 
physical destruction and the loss of life.  In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation 
and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability.”60  One should remember that before 
8:30 am on September 11, 2001 the conventional wisdom of passengers onboard a 
hijacked airplane was to cooperate with the hijackers and not try to fight them.  American 
civilian and military authorities had not considered much less developed and exercised 
robust formal contingency response plans to Middle Eastern terrorists trained to fly 
airliners packed with people into the U.S.’s iconic economic and military symbols of 
hegemony.  Although different than the cyber threat, the high national debt and deficit 
budgets are also significant threats the U.S. must confront. 
High National Debt and Budget Deficits.    
     Today, our national public debt stands at $17.1 trillion.  How did U.S. get to this point 
of massive federal debt and expanded government that endangers our national security 
and solvency?  In 2000, “the U.S. government’s budget was surplus, meaning that the 
total amount of debt was shrinking.  Federal Reserve officials even publicly discussed the 
possibility that all of the debt might be paid off.”61  Then the George W. Bush 
administration had the biggest impact to the federal debt when it initiated and Congress 










over ten years.  Additionally, the costs of the prescription-drug benefit to Medicare and 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq piled on even more debt.62   
     In 2008, the U.S. faced the most severe recession since World War II, and is now 
beginning to show some signs of recovery.  Coupled with the Bush administration 
initiatives, the economic downturn—loss of federal revenues (e.g. due to high 
unemployment, individual and corporate bankruptcies) and the federal government’s 
response to it—stimulus—and other actions taken to stabilize financial markets 
contributed to a rapid buildup in the federal debt held by the public.    “In five years the 
Obama administration has borrowed roughly $5.7 trillion, which is more than the entire 
gross federal debt as recently as the year 2000.  Debt held by the public as a share of 
GDP has nearly doubled in those five years to 76% from 40% in 2008.”63 Under CBO’s 
current policies scenario, it projects the U.S. debt could reach 90% of GDP by 2022; and 
with the growing imbalance of revenues and spending combined with ever-spiraling 
interest payments on the federal debt, its share of GDP could exceed 109 percent by 
2026, and 200 percent in 2037.”64 CBO also admits that projections that far into the 
future are estimates and other factors could have impacts to those numbers.  The 
significant threat is the paralysis of government because of the partisanship between the 
two parties and their different views on the role of government—one expansive, the other 










medicine, military, diplomatic and economic in order to maintain its competitive 
advantage in the global community. 
     Obama understood the magnitude of the harm the federal debt poses and signed an 
Executive Order in February 2010 to establish the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform.  It was composed of 18 members, 6 of whom were appointed 
by the President and 3 appointed by each of the Congressional leaders.  The Commission 
was charged with “identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term 
and to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run…The magnitude and timing of the 
policy measures necessary to achieve this goal are subject to considerable uncertainty and 
will depend on the evolution of the economy.”65  The Executive Order required the 
Commission to submit a final report by December 2010 of recommendations which had 
to be approved by 14 of the 18 members.   Obama continued to identify the rising debt as 
a threat in the May 2010 National Security Strategy:  “Our strategy starts by recognizing 
that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home.  We must 
grow our economy and reduce our deficit.”66  In December 2010, the Commission 
completed its work, however its recommendations fell short by one member.  
Unfortunately, Obama did not incorporate any of the Commission’s recommendations 
(e.g. Social Security reform, elimination of popular itemized tax deductions) in his 











     For the remainder of the spring and summer of 2011, the Obama administration 
pressed Congress to raise the debt ceiling so the government would be able to borrow 
money to pay its obligations and fund spending programs.  They cited dire consequences 
would severely impact Americans’ lives: “…the federal government would have to 
eliminate all spending on discretionary spending programs, cut nearly 70% of outlays for 
mandatory programs, increase revenue collection by nearly two-thirds, or take some 
combination of those actions in the second half of FY2011.”67  Finally, this debt ceiling 
crisis was resolved when Speaker of the House John Boehner and Obama announced an 
agreement on July 31, 2011, the House and Senate passed the Budget Control Act which 
Obama signed.  The agreement allowed the debt ceiling to be raised by $2 trillion while a 
mechanism known as sequestration was part of the agreement.  Beginning in January 
2013 if Congress was unable to identify other spending reductions, sequestration would 
trigger $1.2 trillion in budget cuts over 10 years.  Half of these spending cuts, 
approximately $600 billion (on top of the $400 billion the Obama administration has 
already proposed for the next 10 years) would come from DoD over the next 10 years. 
     These cuts would severely impact the military’s combat readiness. The shrinking 
defense budgets would impact the U.S.’s dominance in efficient and effective combat 
power--“tooth-to-tail”.68  The U.S. would not be able to recruit high quality people and 














and supply expeditionary forces around the globe or invest in research and development 
(R&D) of next generation weaponry.  In fiscal year 2013, sequestration cuts to DoD 
totaled $37 billion, while fiscal year 2014 total could total $52 billion.69  According to 
Clark Murdock, “estimates DoD topline budget reductions are only the first piece of the 
“double whammy” that defense faces today.  Equally serious, the defense dollar has 
lost— and continues to lose—its purchasing power due to the aggregate impact of 
internal cost growth, for personnel, for operations and maintenance, and for acquisition 
programs.  This real spending decrease is estimated at 31% from 2010 to 2021.”70 
     The fiscal crises of high national debts and budget deficits over the long-term may 
degrade the U.S.’s ability to project global military and economic power—weakening its 
defense and deterrence capabilities and thereby endangering its strategic allies and 
interests.  Funding the modernization and maintenance programs of the full-scale nuclear 
triad (which will be discussed later in the chapter) is part of this problem since the U.S. 
government allocates taxpayer money to the nuclear triad instead of concentrating money 
to other current capabilities and future technologies.  According to General Mark A. 
Welsh III, Air Force Chief of Staff, in a November meeting with defense reporters, “The 
cost of modernizing the nuclear infrastructure is not small, and so I think that will lead to 














does that relate to a strategy going forward.”71  As an example, the Air Force’s next 
generation bomber may be deployed as a conventional weapons platform first and add 
nuclear capability later.72   
     In contrast to the significant threats of cyber attacks and high national debt and budget 
deficits, there are still two nations, Russia and China with nuclear weapons that 
technically could pose a Cold War existential threat to the U.S.  
Russian Federation (RF) Nuclear Modernization Program.73 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, the U.S. and RF signed a ten-year New START Treaty 
(formally “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”) on 
April 8, 2010 and ratified by both countries limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
on both sides to 1,550.  There are additional constraints, deployed and non-deployed 
strategic launchers (intercontinental ballistic missiles {ICBM} and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles {SLBM}) and heavy bombers are limited to 800, while deployed 
strategic launchers and heavy bombers are limited at 700 (table 1).  According to the State 
Department, the purpose of these bilateral arms control treaties is to “increase stability in 
the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons.”74  
Currently, the RF is modernizing its nuclear forces—ICBMs, submarines (SSBN) and 














chapter).  Concerning ICBMs, Russia deploys six types:  SS-18 (counter to the 
Peacekeeper ICBM discussed in Chapter 1, carries 10 nuclear warheads and backbone in 
terms of the total number of warheads); SS-19 (carries 6 warheads); mobile SS-25 (carries 
single warhead and accounts for the largest number of launchers); silo-based SS-27, 
mobile SS-27, and RS-24 (a multiple warhead variant of the SS-27).75  RF is replacing 
older ICBMs that were deployed in the 1980’s (SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25) with current 
technology systems, although at a slower pace.  By the end of the New START Treaty 
(2021), Russia plans to have the SS-27s and RS-24s deployed as its ICBM force.   
     Concerning its other nuclear forces, Russia invests the largest portion of military 
spending on modernization of its SSBNs.  The RF has 10 active SSBNs—six Delta IVs 
and four Delta IIIs which Russia is replacing with four new SSBNs, called Borey-class.  
This new SSBN has faced many development issues and that has delayed deployment 
and the new SLBM, slated to be deployed on it, Bulava has performed poorly in flight 
tests.76  ”For its 77 strategic bombers, Blackjack and Bear, Russia is upgrading their 
targeting and navigations systems, at 2-3 per year.  RF has also begun the concept study 
phase of strategic bomber replacement that could have stealth characteristics.”77 
     Finally, there are key considerations about Russia’s mobile ICBM force and the New 
START Treaty limits and provisions.  Since RF has significant numbers of mobile 
ICBMs, the U.S. (has only silo-based ICBMs) could have played hardball and placed 










“mobile ICBMs could enhance the survivability of Russia’s nuclear force, and therefore 
strengthen strategic stability under the new treaty.”78  The U.S. is “far less concerned 
about Russia’s ability to break out of the treaty limits than it was in the 1980s.”79  The 
treaty also limits the locations of mobile ICBMs and their launchers.  The confidence in 
the U.S-RF relationship is further demonstrated by the provision to conduct up to 18 
short notice on-site inspections to each other’s facilities.  As of March 1, 2012, Russia is 
already well within the New START Treaty limit of total number of warheads (1,492) 
compared to the U.S. (1,737), and deployed strategic launchers and heavy bombers (494) 
compared to the U.S. (812) (table 1).80  The U.S. and the RF have developed their 
growing bilateral relationship developed upon conclusion of the Cold War and the 
significant arms control reductions through the New START Treaty.  According to the 
“Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States,” “Although differences 
between our countries continue to arise and Russia continues to modernize its nuclear 
forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and the prospects of 
military confrontation between us have declined dramatically.”81  Like the RF, China is 

















People’s Republic of China (PRC) Nuclear Modernization Program.82 
       The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) runs the government of PRC and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) is the CCP’s armed instrument.  China’s leaders’ strategic 
priorities are “to perpetuate their party’s rule over China through economic growth and 
development which should maintain domestic political stability and defend national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”83   China appears to still operate under former CCP 
leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to avoid confrontation with the current global status quo 
order in order to claim the future prize of world class military and economic power.  
“China’s official policy on nuclear weapons continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear 
force structure able to survive an attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict 
unacceptable damage on an enemy.”84  The PRC realizes it does not have the size of the 
U.S.’s nuclear arsenal, infrastructure and command, control and communications 
capabilities.  Therefore, China “values secrecy over transparency, since it believes 
transparency undermines its confidence in the survivability of its nuclear arsenal.”85  



















that it adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in 
response to a nuclear strike against China.”86 
     Concerning the PRC’s nuclear arsenal, the Second Artillery controls its nuclear and 
conventional ballistic missiles.  The Second Artillery’s nuclear modernization efforts 
include enhancing its silo-based ICBMs and adding more survivable mobile delivery 
systems.  The PRC’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50- 75 ICBMs, 
including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 
2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited range CSS-3 (DF-4).  The CSS-10 Mod 2, 
with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental 
United States.  This force also includes the liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles and road- mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic 
missiles for regional deterrence missions. Additionally, China may be developing a new 
road-mobile ICBM, possibly MIRV-capable.”87   
     Concerning submarines, China continues to modernize its nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN).  “Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are currently 
operational, and up to five may enter service before China proceeds to its next generation 
SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade.  The JIN-class SSBN will carry the new JL-2 
submarine launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of more than 4,000 nm.  The 
JIN-class and the JL-2 will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”88         
     In light of the nuclear modernization, the U.S. still hosted then-PRC President Hu 








stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared 
vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.”89  
Cooperative Engagement Activities. 
 
     The U.S.’s formal cooperative engagement activities with nuclear weapons states 
began at the conclusion of the Cold War.  On June 16, 1992, President George H.W. 
Bush announced with visiting Russian President Boris Yeltsin of a significant nuclear 
weapons reductions framework for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (formally 
signed on January 3, 1993).  In their press conference, Bush stated the agreement took 
five months instead a decade as in previous treaties and that the number of nuclear 
warheads would be reduced from 21,000 to 6,000 for both sides.90  He also stated “the 
United States can assist Russia in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems.”91  
DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program was born.  The next day, Bush and 
Yeltsin signed an agreement to facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of 
nuclear, chemical, and other weapons in RF and the destruction of those weapons to 
comply with START II requirements.   
     In addition to Bush, Senators Nunn and Lugar were early and enduring proponents of 
CTR.  Its mission is to work with partner nations in preventing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear, biological and chemical materials, 
technologies and expertise, and eliminate, secure or consolidate WMD, related materials, 











funding and its cooperative work, Kazakhstan (April 1995), Ukraine (June 1996) and 
Belarus (November 1996) become non-nuclear weapons states.92  CTR’s mission 
supports the national security strategy in which Obama declared:  “The gravest danger to 
the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass 
destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.”93  This presidential-level support has 
translated into CTR’s budget averaging about $400-$500 million each year over the last 
three years.  Its remarkable milestones in the RF and the nations mentioned above are 
breathtaking:  Over 7,600 nuclear warheads have been deactivated; 926 ICBMS 
destroyed; 498 ICBM silos eliminated; modernized security at 24 of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons storage sites; supported 616 shipments of Russian nuclear warheads to more 
secure storage or dismantlement sites (see Appendix A). 
 Since Obama’s inauguration, the U.S. has expanded its cooperative work with the RF 
and former Soviet Union states and has also included other nuclear weapon states such as 
India and China.  In critical ministerial-level discussions which occurred on May 3-4, 
2012 Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Geithner met with their 
Chinese counterparts to participate in the Fourth Round of U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue.   Their productive talks led to outcomes that promote high-level 
exchanges, address regional and global challenges, enhance U.S.-China bilateral 
cooperation, and cooperation on climate change, energy, environment, science and 











commitment to establish a Center for Excellence in Nuclear Security which is a CTR 
project the author advises and supports.94  This center will promote cooperation and 
strengthen nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security best practices and combat nuclear 
terrorism.   
     Additionally, these high-level cooperative engagements have led to other exchanges, 
such as the U.S.-China Cities Forum on Economic Cooperation and Investment.  This 
forum facilitates “investment between the local governments and companies of the two 
economies.”95  Recently, it announced the U.S. and China have signed $3.4 billion in 
bilateral projects that will boost each other’s trade and investment in manufacturing, new 
energy, property, logistics and entertainment.96     
Ballistic Missile Threats. 
     A real and expanding threat to the U.S., its allies and partners is the ballistic missile 
threat.  This is not a new threat but one that has continued to grow from the Cold War, 
with the RF as the only ballistic missile threat to the many nations today who possess 
ballistic missiles.  However, before discussing the current state of the ballistic missile 
threat to the U.S. and its allies, it’s important to provide a very brief historical overview 
of the threat.   
     During the 1950’s and 1960’s, the ballistic (nuclear) missile threats were primarily 












on detecting offensive launches and tracking inbound ballistic missiles; there were very 
limited ways to defend against them.  The first U.S. anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system 
was the Nike Hercules which had limited ability to intercept ballistic missiles.  The U.S. 
restructured an experimental Nike system, a computer complex with new, tracking radars, 
and renamed, the Sentinel program.  With the Soviets deploying an ABM ring around 
Moscow in 1966, President Johnson proposed in 1967 the Sentinel system, which was 
supposed to provide protection for major cities against a ballistic missile attack, in 
particular one by China.”97 
     The goal then which remains true today is an ABM system that defends the U.S. and 
its allies from a limited ballistic missile attack, not an impenetrable national shield 
because it would lead to a nuclear arms race.  Then-Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara stated in a speech in 1967, 
Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system throughout the United States, the Soviets 
would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to 
cancel out our defensive advantage. It is futile for each of us to spend $4 billion, $40 
billion, or $400 billion -and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all the 
deployment, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of 
balance on the security scale that we are now.... If we in turn opt for heavy ABM 
deployment-at whatever price- we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset 
the advantage we would hope to gain.98 
 
In 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I began, which led to the U.S. and 













“deploy two fixed, ground-based defense sites of 100 missile interceptors each. One site 
could protect the national capital, while the second could be used to guard an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field.”99  In 1974, the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
amended the treaty to limit each country to one ABM site.  The Soviet Union decided to 
keep its existing missile defense system, called the Galosh system, which ringed around 
Moscow.  The Nixon Administration decided to deploy the Safeguard system (former 
Sentinel program) and its 100 missile interceptors to defend the Minuteman ICBM base 
at Grand Forks, ND.100  Only months after activating it in October 1975, the House 
Appropriations Committee eliminated funding and ordered the system to be dismantled 
due to the “reasoning that the Soviet Union deploys multiple warheads on its ICBMs ‘the 
utility of Safeguard to protect Minuteman will be essentially nullified in the future.’”101   
     Ronald Reagan sought a different path from the ballistic missile threat of the Soviet 
Union.  His initiative focused on strategic defense rather than strategic offense doctrine of 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).  On March 23, 1983, Reagan announced the SDI 
which would use ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United States from 
attack by strategic nuclear ballistic missiles.  According to Lawrence Freedman, SDI was 
“a technical fix to reduce the nuclear danger…based on the idea that it was better to 
‘protect than avenge.’  SDI sought to exploit new technology to catch missiles in their 
‘boost phase’ that is just as they are launched—or at any point on their trajectory.  









explain than the feasibility of the technology.”102  By 1986, the Reagan Administration 
had entered a missile defense system into the defense acquisition process where the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (forerunner to the current Missile Defense 
Agency) began to develop defenses against widespread missile attacks.103   
     During the 1990’s, the emphasis shifted from a national missile defense to theater 
missile defense.  President George H.W. Bush sponsored a review of the SDI program 
from 1989 to 1990, which “the findings of the study called for the U.S. to shift its defense 
research emphasis from strategic defenses over North America, to the protection of 
deployed forces and allies against limited attacks.”104  The success of the Patriot ABM 
batteries against Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf War may have influenced the 
recommendation.  President Clinton continued on with the pursuit of theater ballistic 
missiles research and development.  Key elements include the Theater High Altitude Air 
Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3), and the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense.  Two key events influenced the Clinton Administration to re-focus 
efforts towards a national missile defense: release of the Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Report (commonly referred to as the 
Rumsfeld Commission Report) in late July 1998 and North Korea’s launch of an 
















towards the end of his administration, Clinton had decided “to defer deployment of a 
national missile defense system, saying ‘the system as a whole is not yet proven,’ instead 
urging further research, development, and testing.”105 
    Under President George W. Bush, missile defense became a central focus of his 
national security strategy because he believed the ballistic missile threat was imminent 
and there was available technology to implement.  In June 2002, after giving a six month 
warning to the RF, Bush declared the U.S. had withdrawn from the ABM treaty.  “The 
U.S. withdrew from the treaty because of the widespread proliferation of ballistic 
missiles” that prevented the U.S. from developing of defenses against rogue states and 
terrorists.106 
     “Rumsfeld had reoriented the missile defense program with a concept for an 
integrated, layered defense that would be capable of attacking warheads and missiles in 
all phases of their flight and was expected to eventually provide global defenses against 
missiles of all ranges.”107  By the end of the Bush Administration, the U.S. had in place a 
limited ballistic missile defense system to protect the homeland, its military forces, allies 
and partners.  To defend against intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile threats, 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors were emplaced in silos at Fort 
Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.  For short-range ballistic missile 











threats, the Aegis ship Standard Missile (SM)-3 was the dedicated ballistic defense 
system against the medium-range missile threats. 
     Soon after taking office, Obama directed the DoD to conduct the first-ever 
Congressionally-mandated review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policies, strategies, 
plans, and programs.   DoD released the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) in 
February 2010, with Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, one of the 
co-leads of the study, stated two policy priorities from the review, “We’re currently 
protected against a limited ballistic missile attack, and will continue to be so for the 
foreseeable future.”108 She also noted that “U.S. homeland missile defense efforts are 
focused on regional actors such as North Korea and Iran, and ‘are not intended to affect 
the strategic balance with Russia or China.’”109  There were four additional BMDR policy 
priorities:  “Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables 
assessment under realistic operational conditions; the commitment to new capabilities 
must be fiscally sustainable over the long term; U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible 
enough to adapt as threats change; and the United States will seek to lead expanded 
international efforts for missile defense.”110  These last four policy priorities encapsulated 
the different perspectives between Bush and Obama on defending against ballistic missile 
threats.  According to Richard Weitz, “The main difference between Obama’s policies 











develop and apply new ballistic missile defense technologies and instead has sought to 
build on proven technologies.”111 
     According to the BMDR, the global trends of ballistic missile systems are becoming 
more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in 
range.”112  Equally concerning to the U.S. is that “today, over thirty countries have 
acquired or are acquiring, short- and medium-range missiles to deliver conventional 
munitions, and some are trying to develop longer ranges to carry nuclear or other WMD 
warheads.”113  China, for example, is working on a range of technologies to attempt to 
counter U.S. and its allies’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuverable 
reentry vehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons.114  
     Since the 2010 BMDR, the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. has continued to increase 
particularly from North Korea and Iran.  In a Missile Defense Announcement on  
March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined four steps the U.S. would 
initiate in order to defend against Iran and North Korea’s pursuit and development of 
longer-range ballistic missiles.  First, the U.S. would add 14 more Ground-Based 
Interceptors (GBI) to the 30 already emplaced in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska; deploy a 
second early warning and tracking radar to Japan; conduct Environmental Impact Studies 
for another potential GBI site in the U.S.  Finally, DoD would restructure the SM-3 IIB 











additional GBIs and improve advanced hit-to-kill vehicle technology.115  According to 
Hagel, “The collective result of these four decisions will be to further improve our ability 
to counter future missile threats from Iran and North Korea, while maximizing 
increasingly scarce taxpayer resources.”116 
     U.S. should dedicate more focus and resources on the significant threats from ballistic 
missile threats, cyber attacks, and its high national debts and budget deficits.  However, 
the U.S.’s focus is still on the Cold War apparatus and the tens of billions of dollars of 
American taxpayer money spent on the nuclear triad. 
Modernization Costs of the U.S. Nuclear Triad. 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, DoD’s bureaucracy to focus and fight the last war—Cold 
War—rather than strategize and prepare for the next conflict or war, costs hundreds of 
billions of American taxpayer dollars for the maintenance, modernization and persistence 
of the U.S. nuclear triad.  During the Cold War, the investments to modernize the triad 
with numerous replacement technologies—solid propellant ballistic missiles carrying 
MIRVs, strategic bomber aircraft (B-1B and B-2) with increased speed, range, payload 
and low observable or “stealth” (B-2) characteristics, and larger and enduring submarines 
carrying increased payload of ballistic missiles—were crucial elements of the U.S. 
deterrent strategy that contributed to the implosion of the Soviet Union on December 25, 








forces.  For example, DoD spent approximately $29 billion in 2008 to sustain, upgrade 
and maintain its nuclear forces and operational support.117  
     A caveat on the progress of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA), the House of Representatives approved HR 4310 (Report of the Committee 
of the Armed Services) on May 16, 2012.  Upon return from the summer recess, the 
Senate still needs to debate and vote on it, mark-up, and follow-up by House and Senate 
committee panels for eventual signature by the president.  In HR 4310, the committee 
reviewed and approved (and in some cases added to) the president’s budgetary request to 
fund DoD and DOE weapon systems and security requirements. Below is not an all-
inclusive summary of the U.S. nuclear triad’s budgetary items.  The analysis will review 
the House of Representatives-approved items to highlight the modernization of strategic 
delivery systems through major life extension programs, commencement of the 
acquisition processes for follow-on systems to the Minuteman III ICBM and Ohio-class 
fleet ballistic missile submarine (“SSBN” or “Boomers”) and a new Long Range Strike 
Bomber (LRSB), Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the nuclear stockpile. 
ICBM Modernization Programs. 
     Currently, the U.S. deploys 450 Minuteman III ICBMs at F.E. Warren Air Force Base 
(AFB), Cheyenne, Wyoming, Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls Montana and Minot AFB, 
Minot, North Dakota.  Over the last twenty years, the Air Force has performed five major 
modernization programs on the Minuteman III force totaling approximately $10B with 








(SLEP), the Air Force has literally modernized the ICBM from nose tip to the rocket 
motor. 
     The Post-Boost System Rocket Engine (PSRE), “fourth” stage on a Minuteman III, 
maneuvers the platform (which holds the nuclear warheads) to a pre-designated position 
in the Earth’s upper atmosphere for their deployment at an adversarial target.  This 
$186M LEP which will be completed in FY 2013, replaces components in the post-boost 
control system, making it easier to maintain and sustain due to original equipment 
manufacturer parts are no longer available.118   
     Next, the Air Force is modifying (completion in 2012) the nuclear warheads on the 
PSRE platform under the Safety Enhanced Reentry System Vehicle (SERV) program 
which cost approximately $106M. The reentry vehicles which house the W-87 warhead 
that were deployed on the Peacekeeper ICBMs (deactivated in 2005) are redeployed on 
the Minuteman III.  According to the Air Force, this program enabled retirement of the 
older MK-12 reentry vehicles and avoided a $1B LEP.119   
     Two major ICBM LEPs are near completion:  Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) 
and Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP).  The GRP cost $1.88B in which the Air 
Force purchased 652 new missile on-board “computers” called guidance sets that are 
easier to maintain and replace the unreliable two-decade old original equipment.   The 











which the Air Force expects to complete in 2013, replaces the aging solid propellant and 
bonding materials in the first and second stages of the Minuteman III and the third stage 
(fiberglass) is remanufactured.   
     There are several budget line items of research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E) for future ballistic missile and nuclear technologies and follow-on strategic 
systems.  First, “ICBM Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD)” has been 
funded in FY13 for about $135M120 (table 1) to ensure the operational life of the 
Minuteman III to 2030.  Through this funding, the AF’s “support equipment program 
($95M) designs, develops, and tests replacement of obsolete/non-serviceable weapon 
system support equipment to include the ICBM’s command and control test software; 
new program to identify the capabilities necessary to replace the trailers used to carry the 
Minuteman downstage (stages 1, 2, and 3) to and from the launch facility; cryptography 
upgrade to increase nuclear security ($32M); and solid rocket motor modernization 
($8M) will accomplish studies to investigate the application of new technologies into the 
Minuteman III booster stack.”121  Another related Air Force RDT&E effort, “ICBM 
Demonstration (DEM)/Validation (VAL)” is funded at $71M122 and a component of this 















research and development industrial base and critical infrastructure.”123  Another project 
under ICBM DEM/VAL is the Ground Based Strategic Deterrence ($11M), the beginning 
process to identify materiel solutions and Analysis of Alternatives for a recommended 
follow-on to the Minuteman III.124  
SLBM Modernization. 
     Like the Air Force, the Navy is also conducting research and development program 
for replacement of its strategic delivery system—14 Ohio-class submarines—known as 
“SSBNX”.  The Navy will procure the first of 12 SSBNXs in FY21 and the last one in 
FY41.  In contrast to the 24 ballistic missile launch tubes on the Ohio-class SSBNs, the 
SSBNX will be outfitted with 16 launch tubes.125  The Navy had requested $555M 
RDT&E money for FY13; however the committee increased the program funding by 
$374M for a total of $929M.126  This program’s budget request ramps up to nearly $1.1B 
in FY16; its mission description states the program “supports innovative research and 
development in submarine hull and combat systems technologies and the subsequent 
evaluation, demonstration, and validation for submarine platforms.”127  Navy budget 
estimates for the first SSBNX will be $5.6B and its reviewing ways to bring the costs to 


















Office estimates the life-cycle costs for the 12 future fleet ballistic missile submarines 
will be $86B (about $7.2B each) combined with research and development of $10 to $15 
billion, for a grand total to the American taxpayer of $96 to $101B.”129 
Bomber Modernization Programs. 
     The Air Force also requested and the House of Representatives approved funding for 
bomber modernization programs on B-1B, B-2, and B-52 aircraft, weapons and new 
LRSB totaling $983M.130 Recall from Chapter 1 the B-1B is a conventional only bomber 
aircraft.  Like the Minuteman programs, the House Armed Services Committee 
demonstrated ebullience in spending on bombers with nuclear weapons capability.  In HR 
4310, the committee directs the Air Force to ensure the LRSB is capable of nuclear 
operations upon achieving initial operational capability.131  The appropriation for the 
LRSB is RDT&E funding which for FY13 is $291M following $192M in FY11, $294M 
in FY12, and eventually ramping up to $2.7B in FY17.132   
     Additionally, the committee directed DoD to deliver a report by February 2013 
detailing plans on costs, and ensuring a next-generation nuclear warhead equipped air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) capability.133  This new ALCM, project called Long 
Range Standoff Weapon would replace the current inventory of aging cruise missiles and 
















penetrate sophisticated integrated air defense systems and strike strategic targets deep 
into the adversary’s country.  The president’s FY13 budget request is $2.0M, and ramps 
up to $352M in FY17.134 
Nuclear Weapons LEPs. 
      Like the strategic delivery systems discussed above, the nuclear warheads and 
bombs—Minuteman III warhead fuzes and B61 gravity bomb—that are the destructive 
elements are also undergoing LEPs.  Concerning nuclear weapons modernization, the Air 
Force requested and the committee recommended funding of $73M in FY13, ramping up 
to $433M in FY17 to conduct concept studies, system engineering, modeling and 
simulation and integration planning in the replacement of fuzes for two types of warheads 
for the Minuteman III.135  The fuzing system is a critical element because it originates the 
electronic signal that triggers the firing system—allowing the arming and safing of a 
nuclear weapon.  The B61 gravity bomb LEP will review feasibility, design, cost, test 
equipment, technical data and select the best approach and integrate it on current and 
future aircraft (e.g. F-35 Lightning II and LRSB).  The president’s budget request and 
















     Related to the industrial base, the committee recommended funding for the nuclear 
weapons stockpile which provides the stewardship, management, expertise, and materials 
to LEPs.  In the FY13 president’s budget request, the committee agreed and 
recommended $2.1B to the Department of Energy’s Directed Stockpile Work which has 
four sub programs:  1.) LEPs, to extend the lifetime and reliability of the nuclear 
stockpile without having to conduct underground nuclear detonation testing; 2.) Stockpile 
Systems, which are joint DOE-DoD acquisition efforts to sustain the warheads and 
bombs in the stockpile; 3.) Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition; and 4) Stockpile 
Services are the research, development and production capabilities.137  In FY11 and 
FY12, Congress had appropriated approximately the same amounts to the Directed 
Stockpile Work activities.  Given the enormous expenditures on this snapshot of the 
nuclear triad, it’s evident the U.S. needs to perform a clean-sheet approach on its national 
security strategy and its priorities to achieve those objectives because its focus—policies, 
programs, expenditures, and manpower—still revolve around the Cold War framework.  
Instead, the U.S. should focus on its significant threats, strategize for the “unforeseen” 
threats or conflicts and continue to pursue emerging and future technologies and 
capabilities. 
Current, Emerging and Future Technologies and Capabilities. 
     The analysis will look at just a few of the exciting current and new/emerging 








industry as well as capabilities being discussed in public forums.  The U.S. should 
consider investing more government resources such as funding and manpower toward 
these current and emerging technologies and streamline organizations in order to 
continue its primacy in the global community.  These technologies are the Air Force’s 
unmanned space plane, Boeing’s unmanned airborne system, trend watching software, 
transformation approach on security software and an organizational change to U.S. Cyber 
Command that would increase its capability. 
     When the U.S. retired its space shuttle fleet, it lost a means to access space both for 
manned operations (e.g. experiments) and insertion of space satellites.  The Air Force has 
twice successfully demonstrated an unmanned space plane capability.  The system is 
known as Orbital Test Vehicle, X-37B.  “On June 16, 2012, the X-37B steered itself and 
landed at Vandenberg AFB, California, completing a 15-month clandestine mission.  In 
2010, the first unmanned space plane returned to Earth after seven months and 91 million 
miles in orbit.”138  The Air Force is testing the two OTVs robotically controlled reusable 
spacecraft technologies.139  The potential capabilities for the OTV are quicker capability 
over a battlefield to assess bomb damage, and adversarial movements and a prompt 
access to space in deployment of a small satellite.  Another potential capability would be 
to develop the OTV for humanitarian purposes in assessment of areas devastated by 
natural disasters such as fires and hurricanes.  In his testimony before a Senate Armed 
Services subcommittee, General William Shelton, Air Force Space Command 









2011 is proving the flexibility of this unique system.”140 The U.S. should continue to 
invest and test this capability and determine future applications.   
     Like the Air Force’s OTV the Boeing Phantom Eye is an unmanned aircraft system.  
However, they look and operate completely different.  The Phantom Eye completed its 
first autonomous flight on June 1, 2012 which lasted 28 minutes.141  Its eventual mission 
would be to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and transfer the 
acquired information to military, civilian and commercial customers.  “Phantom Eye 
brings a new level of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) to the aviation world. It’s 
efficient and environmentally responsible liquid-hydrogen propulsion system is a first of 
its kind, creating only water as a byproduct of its engines. 142  Phantom Eye could remain 
on station for days compared to hours by current unmanned drones being flown in 
Afghanistan.  Also, the Phantom Eye’s concept of operations is ISR which is different 
from the current drones which are loaded with munitions.  So far, no U.S. government 
agency has procured the Boeing prototype unmanned aircraft.   
     Another cutting edge technology is “Big data” mined from cell phones, social media 
such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and other services that provide a gauge of the 
collective mood of the populace.  A World Economic Forum report described “personal 












such as traded goods, gold or oil.”143  Personal data is stimulating innovative new 
products tailored to and personalized for the specific needs of individuals.  Trading 
companies are developing software to collect sentiment data gathered from various social 
media and converting the data into algorithms that assigns scores on positive or negative 
feelings.  These trends indicate whether there is an upcoming bull or bear market.  
Another example of big data usage is in the developing world the mobile phone is the 
low-income person’s only access to the interactive technology and easier to link their 
personal data. 
     Of course, this collection and manipulation of “Big data” is a new and ever-expanding 
area that has few rules so security of data and civil rights issues are already important 
concerns.    For example, a trader who develops a software program to analyze and assess 
collective moods may be gaining an “insider information” advantage that is not available 
to the general public.  Or there could be the unscrupulous trader who falsely generates 
positive or negative phrases or words about a stock or bond in the social media 
contributing to people buying or selling that stock or bond.  The trader would profit by 
generating false information.  This new economic asset is a new frontier that the U.S. 
government should focus and understand the potential good and disruptive capabilities of 
“Big data”; personal data collection is here to stay and may be a public and private 
benefit or a future threat. 
     Related to data collection is the penetration and propagation of computer malware.  
The U.S. government needs to lead an effort to solve how to develop an emerging 







According to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn, commercial-off-the-shelf 
defense software has 5-10 million lines of code compared to the average malware of 
about 175 lines of code.144  A company who may consider a multimillion line of defense 
software code a labor-intensive and cost-prohibitive might accept the risk in order to save 
its resources.  The vulnerability if the malware is successful would be public, personal 
and proprietary compromise of information.  The U.S. government should establish a 
blue ribbon commission of the technology industry, government agencies and software 
users as well as “white hat” hackers to once and for all cease the incentive to develop 
malware.  This effort should be transformational—removing software, hardware, 
firmware and cloud computing paradigm issues in order for the solution to nearly match 
defense software lines of code to that of a malware’s.  The emerging technology would 
enhance individual and collective security and instill confidence in the institutions 
monitoring and protecting personal and public information. 
     Finally, the purview of cyber security and cyber crime is U.S. Cyber Command which 
oversees and coordinates DoD’s efforts to counter attacks on the .mil domain.  A four-
star general officer leads U.S. Cyber Command which is based at Fort Meade, MD and is 
a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command in Nebraska (also led by a four 
star general).  U.S. Strategic Command is one of nine combatant commands whose four-
star commanders report directly to the president.  U.S. Cyber Command is not a 
combatant command.  Why does a four-star general at U.S. Cyber Command have to 








The real threat of the cyber attacks requires U.S. Cyber Command to have the focus, 
increased visibility across government agencies and the prestige of being a combatant 
command that reports directly to the president, not another layer of bureaucracy of action 
officers!  During the Cold War, Americans knew that “SAC”—Strategic Air Command 
(now U.S. Strategic Command) operated and maintained the nuclear weapons.  Now, in 
2013, a new and expanding significant threat must be addressed and U.S. Cyber 
Command seen as the holder of the new codes. 
 
Conclusion 
“Cold war days are over.”145  Over twenty years ago, President George H.W. Bush stated 
those short but succinct words.   The U.S. and RF may have reduced the nuclear 
warheads on alert or deployed, yet the same focus on nuclear modernization is still very 
much alive.   Why?  DoD’s bureaucracy is perpetuating the system of nuclear triad.  As 
the analysis has shown there are now significant threats of the cyber attack (and its 
variants of cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber war) and the U.S.’s high and sky 
rocketing national debt and budget deficits that is now impacting the U.S.  There is only a 
finite amount of money and Americans’ confidence in its governing institutions.  The 
U.S. government should reassess its national strategy and realize cyber attacks and its 
financial calamity could be just around the corner.  We don’t know what new 
international crisis will pop up, however, the U.S. needs to have an “all hands on deck” to 









ensure its financial solvency and economic and military primacy.  If the U.S. loses its 
reputation in the global investment community as the safe haven to invest due to its 
skyrocketing national debt, the U.S. may not able to have funding for research and 
development of emerging technologies and capabilities to project power in the world. 
     In analyzing the nuclear triad’s modernization and life extension programs and 
observing in table 2 highlighting the president’s FY13 budget items totaling $4.6B for 
strategic systems such as a new long range bomber and a ballistic missile capable 
submarine replacement program that will cost the American taxpayers over a $100B.  
The U.S. should re-focus its strategy, policies, and funding to pursue emerging and future 
technologies and capabilities that can help solve threats and challenges facing the 
country.  
     A Research and Thesis Chapter 3 should assess the president’s recent nuclear force 




















































Program Name Cost $M (in millions) 
ICBM Engineering, Manufacturing and 
Development 
135.437 
ICBM Demonstration/Validation 71.181 
Navy Strategic Ballistic-Missile Submarine 
Replacement  
929.523# 
B-1, B-2, and B-52 Weapons and New 
Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) 
923.100 
LRSB Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation 
291.742 
Nuclear Air-launch Cruise Missile Long 
Range Standoff Weapons 
2.0 
Minuteman III Nuclear Warhead Fuzes 73.0 
B61 Gravity Bomb Life Extension Program 80.0 


































     As discussed in Chapter 2, the U.S. faces multiple threats such as its high national 
debt and budget deficits.  This budget predicament evolves daily:  On May 14, 2013, 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel directed that 650,000 government civilian employees 
would be furloughed for eleven days between July 8 and September 30, 2013 as part of 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) sequester cuts of $37 billion to meet obligations of 
the 2011 Budget Control Act.  This too has changed:  On August 6, 2013, Hagel 
announced there would only be six furloughed days due to receiving congressional 
approval to reprogram (move) DoD money from acquisition accounts to day-to-day 
operations money.146  Despite George H.W. Bush (41) declaring over twenty years ago 
that the cold war is over, the U.S. continues to spend billions of precious American 
taxpayer dollars on modernizing its nuclear triad strategic systems.   
     Since declaring his vision of a world without nuclear weapons in a speech delivered in 
Prague in 2009, Obama signed the New START Treaty in 2010 with the Russian 
Federation (RF) continuing the downward trend in both nations’ nuclear arsenals.  On 
June 19, 2013 speaking in Berlin, Obama stated he had determined that a further 
reduction of deployed strategic warheads—a 30% reduction from the New START 
Treaty —would not impact our national security.  Obviously, there are both critics and 







wrong on the future of nuclear weapons?  Given the nuclear use taboo discussed in 
Chapter 1 and the vast expenditures of billions of American taxpayer dollars spent on 
nuclear forces and its enterprise discussed in Chapter 2, is a more transformative nuclear 
strategy and associated force structure more appropriate to meet the nation’s challenges?  
Or is the slow trickle of the downward trajectory of arms reductions a better way to 
assure U.S. national security and primacy? 
     This analysis is important because the U.S. nuclear triad is still in place--50 years and 
several signed arms reduction treaties later--and appears to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  Along the way, the U.S. has invested billions of dollars to modernize and 
maintain these delivery systems and the nuclear weapons.   Given the current and future 
challenges and threats of economic stagnation, cyber attacks, Russian and Chinese 
nuclear arsenals, and ballistic missile threats, the U.S. needs to address the viability of its 
nuclear strategy and nuclear triad.  The thesis analysis will use the empirical method.  In 
analyzing the above questions, the thesis will briefly highlight the president’s 
accomplishments in the nuclear-related areas, analyze his recent guidance on U.S. nuclear 
weapons employment strategy, briefly review an op-ed article by critics of Obama’s new 
strategy; then the thesis will present an illustrative nuclear strategy and force structure; 





Obama’s nuclear-related accomplishments 
     On June 12, 2013, in front of the historic Brandenburg Gate and 4,500 invited German 
citizens, Obama presented his long-awaited nuclear strategy147 guidance that his 
administration would implement.  In 2009, Obama described to the people of the Czech 
Republic and the world that the threat of nuclear war may have dissipated but now a 
nuclear attack from nations seeking nuclear weapons and non-state actors is high:   
“The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous 
legacy of the Cold War…More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has 
continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. 
The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, 
build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global 
non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we 
could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”148 
 
     His visionary speech in Prague outlined a future without nuclear weapons, highlighted 
the extreme threat of nuclear terrorism, and a call to secure vulnerable nuclear materials 
in four years.  Since 2009, Obama has made substantive progress toward achieving this 
vision.  This list includes three key accomplishments: 1.) The New START Treaty signed 
by Obama and Medvedev in April 2010 and ratified by the Senate in December 2010; 
overall, the treaty limits the U.S. and the RF to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 


















Posture Review (NPR) in April 2010 was signed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates.  The review identified two significant changes from previous NPRs:  U.S. nuclear 
weapons would be reduced in scope in the national security strategy, and “the United 
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states 
that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation 
obligations”150; and 3.) Obama’s initiative to host global leaders (at the presidential level) 
at a biennial forum called the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).  This was a framework to 
discuss ways on “strong nuclear security measures…the most effective means to prevent 
terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.”151  
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).  
     The NSS doesn’t get as much publicity and recognition as a bilateral arms reduction 
treaty or a high-level quadrennial government report like the NPR.  However, this forum 
has developed in a short time to be a platform for the discussion of nuclear weapons, 
fissile materials, and nuclear security.  Obama hosted the first NSS in Washington, D.C. 
on April 12-13, 2010 with 47 heads of state who in the communiqué stated “shared goals 
of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we 
also share the objective of nuclear security.”152  His NSS initiative has proven to be a 
successful forum of cooperation and relationship-building.  From the Prague speech, 














commitments signed in treaties such as the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the International Convention on 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror (ICSANT).  The NSS was born from the Prague 
speech, provides the legal pinning for the global nuclear security architecture—
comprising of treaties, best practices, bilateral/multilateral agreements, and institutions 
such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism—to invite and nurture the 
international community of nations to accept and participate.   
     The NSS has not been a “schmooze” and glitzy photo session for heads of state.  
Rather, the NSS are productive sessions with structure and deliverables.  For example, 
the first NSS in 2010 developed a “Work Plan” identified in its communiqué that the 47 
nations pledged to continue cooperation in nuclear security against the universal threat of 
nuclear terrorism; reaffirmed the vital role of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in the international nuclear security framework and to assist it in resources; 
support CPPNM and ICSANT; and identified and discussed improved methods and “best 
practices” in the nuclear security field.153  During this summit, a key bilateral cooperative 
effort was announced:  Obama and the President of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), Hu Jintao agreed to jointly establish a nuclear security center of excellence (COE) 
in Beijing.   
     The new partnership would establish a COE that would be a forum to exchange 
technical information, share best practices, develop training courses and promote 






vulnerable nuclear materials. 154  The China COE will serve as a focal point to promote 
multilateral nuclear security throughout the Asia-Pacific region and the international 
community at large.  In January 2011, U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his PRC 
counterpart, China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) Chairman Chen Quifa signed the 
memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a U.S.-China COE, which Obama 
announced during Hu’s State visit.155  As discussed in the Chapter 2, the China COE is 
one of the top talking points of the formal U.S-PRC Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues.156  The COE is scheduled to be completed in June 2015.  
     Finally, another important cooperative engagement was announced at the 2010 NSS.  
Obama, Medvedev and the President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayhev, together pledged to 
complete the securing of plutonium in the underground Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 
Kazakstan.  This was a critical partnership to secure vulnerable and abundant nuclear 
materials.  Eben Harrell and David E. Hoffman reported that in the Degelen Mountain in 
Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union used the underground site during the Cold War to test its 
arsenal of plutonium nuclear warheads.  After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the 
test site became a haven for thieves and terrorists seeking to recover or “mine” nuclear 

















1990’s, DoD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency capped what was thought to be 
vulnerable entrances.  In 2005, after years of prodding by U.S. senior officials and 
scientists, cautious Russian scientists revealed the full extent of the vulnerable nuclear 
materials in the Delegren Mountain underground site:  220 pounds of recoverable 
plutonium.158  This was enough to make more than a dozen nuclear bombs.     
     President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea hosted the second NSS on March 26-27, 
2012 in Seoul.  Like the 2010 NSS, the 2012 one was productive in continuing the path 
of cooperation on nuclear security.  This summit had an increase in 53 heads of state and 
government in attendance compared to 2010’s 47.  The seven new participants were 
Azerbaijan, Denmark, Gabon, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and INTERPOL. The Seoul 
Communique builds on the objectives and measures set out in 2010, and presented a 
“work plan” that identified 11 areas of concern in nuclear security and specific actions 
needed in each area.  “The 11 areas are: the global nuclear security architecture; the role 
of the IAEA; nuclear materials; radioactive sources; nuclear security and safety; 
transportation security; combating illicit trafficking; nuclear forensics; nuclear security 
culture; information security; and international cooperation.”159  
     During the 2012 NSS, a major cooperative engagement that touched nearly all eleven 
areas of concern mentioned above, Obama, Medvedev, and Nazarbayhev announced the 
completion of the $150 million effort to secure the plutonium in the tunnels of the 










tunnels and holes with a special concrete.160  According to Eben and Hoffman, “this 
greatly reduced one of the largest nuclear security threats since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.”161 This is another example that the NSS continues to be a productive forum for 
nuclear weapons states and non-weapons states to seek the common ground of nuclear 
security and work cooperatively to enhance their nation’s and citizens’ safety. 
     The Netherlands will host the 2014 NSS to follow-up with the objectives and goals 
from the 2012 NSS and set new mileposts.  During the June 2013 Berlin speech, Obama 
declared the U.S. would host the 2016 NSS--one way to ensure the U.S. and the 
international community continues on the right track to cooperatively engage on nuclear 
security and prevent terrorists and rogue nations from obtaining nuclear materials to build 
and detonate a nuclear weapon.  Obama’s Prague speech framed how his new 
administration would approach the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal and how he viewed the U.S. 
role to lead the world’s non-proliferation effort in securing vulnerable nuclear materials 
to prevent a new generation of living in fear in the Nuclear Age. 
Updated U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy 
      On June 19, 2013, a week after Obama’s Berlin speech, the DoD unveiled the 
“Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 
of 10 U.S.C.”:  the “nuclear strategy”.  This new guidance marks only the third update 
since the end of the Cold War and the first one since 2002 that a president has issued the 









strategy, specifically the sections on “NPR Follow-On Analysis,” “Modifications to 
Nuclear Employment Strategy,” “Implications for the U.S. Nuclear Posture and Nuclear 
Stockpile,” and “Additional Implications”; the two new initiatives discussed in the 
nuclear strategy will also be reviewed. 
NPR Follow-On Analysis. 
     Nuclear weapons are in essence, the President’s weapons, as Commander-in-Chief of 
the U.S. Armed Forces.  The guidance states the President’s role on nuclear weapons:  
“…the sole authority to order the employment of U.S. nuclear forces.”163  Unlike other 
military operations such as drone attacks and cyber attacks, no general or admiral or for 
that matter appointed (e.g., Secretary of Defense) or other elected official (including the 
vice president of the U.S.) except the president, can issue orders to conduct a nuclear 
strike.  The DoD, specifically, Military Service components, Air Force and Navy oversee 
and manage the triad forces—bombers (B-52 and B-2) and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)--are custodians of 
these weapons.  They ensure the nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and effective.  This 
concept is the foundation of the four guiding principles on the role of U.S. nuclear 
weapons:  1.) to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and its Allies; 2.) to use nuclear weapons 
in extreme circumstances to defend its strategic interests or those of its Allies: 3.) to 
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so a potential adversary will determine the risks to 








lowest possible number of nuclear weapons for the U.S.’s and Allies’ current and future 
requirements.164 
     The eight and one-half pages long report is a follow-up to the quadrennial 2010 NPR 
and New START Treaty, identifying politically the path the U.S. intends to pursue with 
its nuclear weapons in the upcoming year and out to 2018.  Concerning the “NPR 
Follow-On Analysis Section,” the president’s guidance reiterates the five objectives of 
U.S. policy on its nuclear weapons and posture discussed in the NPR165: 
1. Prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 
2. Reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 
3. Maintain strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 
4. Strengthen regional deterrence and reassure U.S. Allies and partners; and 
5. Sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 
 
With their updated analysis, DoD added a sixth objective to provide the president more 
options if deterrence fails:  “Achieve U.S. and Allied objectives if deterrence fails.”166  
The guidance repeats Obama’s Prague speech themes of the peace and security of a world 
without nuclear weapons.   
     Overall, the president’s guidance seems bland and unremarkable and could have been 
promulgated by either Presidents Bill Clinton or George W. Bush.  There are only a 
couple new items that hadn’t been addressed before in previous policy discussions; the 
new initiatives of Obama’s nuclear strategy may not be quickly implemented in the near 
future.  At the beginning of the report, there appears to be a seeking of “cover” and 
legitimacy:  “This strategy has the support of the Commander of U.S. Strategic 









statement in the guidance?  Is it to provide the reader with confidence that these leaders 
project the “gravitas” and expertise that Obama may feel insecure when presenting his 
nuclear strategy and the two new initiatives within it?    
     In the strategy guidance there are also redundancies of talking points, inconsistencies 
and questionable statements, as well as noteworthy omissions, which will be discussed 
later in the chapter.   For example, the report twice mentions the need to take a concrete 
step toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and reduce nuclear weapons’ 
central role in the U.S. national security strategy.  Also, the guidance stated six times that 
the U.S. seeks “to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China.”  While 
immediately after this first mention, the guidance is inconsistent in this significant 
recognition of the U.S.-RF relationship:  “Although differences between our countries 
continue to arise and Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces, Russia and the 
United States are no longer adversaries and the prospects, and the prospects of military 
confrontation between us have declined dramatically.”168  If the RF, which is the U.S.’s 
nuclear peer, isn’t the enemy and the chances unlikely of a military conflict, then, what is 
preventing our nation from moving to the next transformational phase of significant 
reduction of nuclear weapons and the accompanied dramatic changes in nuclear strategy 
and postures? 
Modifications to Nuclear Employment Strategy. 
     In this section, there is a continuation of inconsistent yet significant recognition of the 
U.S.-RF relationship:  “Although the need for numerical parity between the two countries 






capabilities could raise concerns on both sides,” and among our allies and maintenance of 
long-term relationship.169  The strategy paragraph concluded by stating the U.S. deemed 
it important that Russia be part of any lowering of nuclear weapons.  From these 
statements, it appears that the lack of confidence in its relationship with the RF and 
eagerness to assure its allies hampers the U.S. transformation in its approach on nuclear 
strategy, and hence its force structure and postures.   The U.S. appears to be dependent on 
RF’s approval to lower levels of nuclear warheads.  As mentioned earlier this guidance 
also discusses the outlook on another nuclear weapon state, China and its growth and 
modernization efforts. 
     Unfortunately, the guidance only has two short paragraphs discussing the U.S.’s 
concern on China.  According to the report, the U.S. is concerned about China’s 
modernization of its conventional and nuclear forces because of the PRC’s lack of 
transparency in its policy, strategy and doctrine.  The U.S. does not have a clear 
understanding of China’s long-term goals in the region and the rest of the world.  
Although, the guidance states multiple times the U.S. is committed to “maintaining 
strategic stability in U.S.-China relations,” it has only one muddled sentence specifically 
on how the U.S. views its nuclear employment strategy towards China:   
“… supports initiation of a dialogue on nuclear affairs aimed at fostering a more stable, 
resilient, and transparent security relationship with China.”170  What is the president 
trying to convey to the American people, the PRC and our allies with this ambiguous and 
half-hearted statement?  The lack of clarity on how the U.S. focuses (generally) its 







Richard Betts notes, “The most dangerous long-term risk posed by Washington’s 
confusion over deterrence lies in the avoidance of a choice one way or the other about the 
strategy when it comes to China.  Washington needs to determine whether to treat Beijing 
as a threat to be contained or a power to be accommodated.”171 
     Finally, there is a statement that captures one of the reasons why the U.S. and RF 
continue to deploy high numbers of nuclear warheads.   The strategy refers to the NPR 
and the Obama administration’s goal to safely adopt a policy of making deterrence of 
nuclear attack the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear weapons.  The guidance then states, 
“Although we cannot adopt such a policy today, the new guidance reiterates the intention 
to work toward that goal over time.”172  What is preventing the U.S. from adopting the 
position now as policy?  When is “over time” going to occur?  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the U.S. is stuck in the past paradigm of its bureaucracy thinking nuclear weapons are 
usable.   
Implications for the U.S. Nuclear Posture and Nuclear Stockpile. 
     The next section discusses guidance for the employment of nuclear forces and 
direction for the posture of deployed forces—the nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and 
bombers.  Here, the U.S. states that retaining the nuclear triad will “best maintain 
strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems 
or vulnerabilities.”173   In “maintaining strategic stability” discussed earlier, the nuclear 
guidance then couples it with “reasonable cost.” What is this reasonable cost, and to 








U.S. spent approximately $B on the nuclear weapons enterprise in fiscal year (FY) 2012.   
Besides maintaining strategic stability, the nuclear guidance adds “hedging” as an 
additional factor in retaining the nuclear triad; it mentions six times similar phrases: 
“hedging against technical or geopolitical risk with fewer nuclear weapons” and “upload 
strategic delivery platforms in response to geopolitical or technological surprise.”174  This 
sounds like a catchall and clinging to the same way of doing business:  “just in case we’re 
wrong, we can re-establish.”  The guidance repeats the 2010 NPR (the first one since 
2001) objective of the U.S. shift from hedging with large numbers of non-deployed 
nuclear warheads to a responsive infrastructure that will sustain the nuclear arsenal.175  
Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in the NPR176 of the critical need of 
investing much more money “to rebuild America’s aging nuclear infrastructure.  To this 
end, I asked for nearly $5 billion to be transferred from the Department of Defense to the 
Department of Energy over the next several years.  These investments, and the NPR’s 
strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the 
nuclear infrastructure and support our nation’s deterrent.” 177 With the U.S. facing a 
tough economic period, and incurring high debt and generating budget deficits, is this the 
right time to be transferring billions of dollars from one government department to 















capital investment towards new national security laboratories and associated support 
facilities in order to sustain nuclear weapons over the long term.  As one example of the 
vast expenditures on future nuclear complexes, National Nuclear Security 
Administration178 (NNSA) Acting Administrator Neile Miller testified to Congress on the 
planned Uranium Capabilities Replacement (UCR) project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee that 
will:   
We’re modernizing our uranium capabilities.  We don’t always need a new 
construction project to get things done, but when it comes to ensuring the United 
States’ uranium capabilities, we do.  Replacing the decaying 9212 facility at the 
Y-12 National Security Complex is a critical investment in our future, and we’re 
close to beginning work on the new Uranium Processing Facility that will take its 
place.  As we near 90% design completion, we have continued to better refine our 
needs, how we’ll meet them, and exactly how much it will cost.  To help us get 
there, the President has requested $326M in FY14 for the Uranium Capabilities 
Replacement project.179  
  
    NNSA states this facility “will ensure the long-term viability, safety, and security of 
the EU [enriched uranium] capability in the United States.  The UCR Project will support 
the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, down blending of EU in support of 
nonproliferation, and provide uranium as feedstock for fuel for naval reactors.”180  In 
2004, NNSA estimated this project cost at $1.1 billion but the U.S. Government 
















billion.181 However, the project construction costs are projected to increase over the next 
years.  In 2011, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) provided cost estimates and the start 
of operations dates of the UCR for two funding scenarios.  The first scenario, assumed 
annual appropriations were not subject to budget constraints and the cost range is $6.5 to 
$7.5 billion, and operations begin in FY 2023.  Unfortunately, over $900 million will be 
required annually for four consecutive fiscal years in order to complete the project.182   In 
the second scenario, the annual appropriations are subject to budget constraints contained 
in NNSA's February 2011 guidance:  estimates are 35% higher than the first scenario--
$10.3 to $11.6 billion and the facility begins operations in FY 2035.   Incredibly, to fund 
the construction, between $200 and $500 million annually would be required to complete 
the project.183  In 22 years, will the U.S. still need this capability to support the nuclear 
warhead stockpile?  And after all this capital investment, will this nuclear facility be 
obsolete before it even begins operations?   These ACE estimates UCR project 
construction completion; it does not include the operations and maintenance (O&M) 
costs for the 50-year life cycle of the facility.  Also, how many of the next generation of 
scientists, engineers, security and staff personnel will be recruited, hired, and trained to 
sustain the nuclear stockpile?  What are these costs for example, to the American 
taxpayer?  The last section of the nuclear employment strategy continues to generate 











     In the nuclear employment strategy’s final section, the guidance discusses the goal of 
U.S. increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear forces, and missile defenses.  This 
section reiterates the 2010 NPR second of the five objectives of U.S. policy on nuclear 
weapons and posture discussed earlier in the chapter:  “Reduce the role of U.S. nuclear 
weapons in U.S. national security strategy.”  The nuclear guidance attempts to explain 
how the U.S. will achieve this goal:  “DoD will conduct deliberate planning for non-
nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through 
integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these 
objectives and effects achievable.”184  DoD has already been doing this; it has planned 
and conducted integrated and non-nuclear strike military operations per commander-in-
chief directives:  the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War and Afghanistan War.  In fact, DoD 
continues to operate under two formal and legal mechanisms that conduct deliberate 
planning for non-nuclear strike options that are integrated.  These mechanisms are called 
the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Combatant Commands (COCOM) that are 
covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military Law; Part I–
Organization and General Military Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands.  Both of 
these mechanisms trace their origins to World War II.  The UCP is a classified document 
submitted by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and updated biennially.  This 
document “assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and 








COCOMs; functional COCOMs (e.g., U.S. Transportation Command) operate world-
wide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic 
COCOMs and the Military Services.  The other type of COCOM is geographic which 
operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and focus on the region it is assigned 
(e.g., U.S. European Command).186  According to Dr. Cynthia Watson, a professor at the 
National War College, COCOMs are: “Commands in charge of utilizing and integrating 
air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U.S. national 
security objectives while protecting national interests.”187 The planning for synchronized, 
non-nuclear strike options and execution already exists within the UCP and COCOM 
structures.  The nuclear guidance ends by repeating the goal of reducing the role of the 
nuclear weapons in the national security strategy because “non-nuclear elements will take 
on a greater share of the deterrence burden,” has already occurred in U.S. pre-planning 
and execution of military operations.  Although the nuclear strategy guidance mentions 
numerous (nine) times the “non-nuclear elements/strike” phrase, two initiatives—future 
nuclear reductions and launch under attack—were briefly mentioned once. 
Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy’s Two Initiatives. 
      The two initiatives in Obama’s nuclear employment strategy—reduction in nuclear 
weapons beyond the New START Treaty and DoD to review the options of launch under 













weapons post-New START Treaty, this determination appeared on page six of an eight 
and one-half nuclear employment strategy document.  Without any special text or 
position designation, the declaration of one-third reduction of nuclear warheads could 
easily have been missed, if it were not for Obama’s speech one week prior highlighting 
his intention.  This evolved position on arms reduction follows through on Obama’s 
speech in Berlin that “the U.S. could secure itself, its allies and partners and maintain a 
credible strategic deterrent with one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons from the New START Treaty.  And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia 
to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.” 188   
     Obama’s declaration for further arms cuts would bring the U.S. and RF arsenals down 
to approximately 1,000 to 1,100 nuclear warheads.  Why not more?  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Bush 41 and RF President Boris Yeltsin cut nuclear warheads from 21,000 to 
6,000.  With the Cold War declared over in 1992, each successive president has followed 
the slow, downward trajectory of a few hundred nuclear warhead reductions.   This 
nuclear strategy mentions the U.S. and RF will continue to have differences and “Russia 
continues to modernize its nuclear forces,” however the U.S. and RF are no longer 
adversaries.  The U.S. also continues to modernize its strategic forces as the thesis 
analyzed in Chapter 2.   
     The nuclear employment strategy discussed the analysis, as a follow-up to the 2010 
NPR and examined the nuclear deterrence requirements “in order to align U.S. nuclear 
planning to the current and projected security environment.”189  However, there was no 







development, DoD analysts examined potential options of nuclear employment strategy 
and implications to the triad forces, if implemented.  Obama selected the published 
nuclear employment strategy based on the advice from DoD and other involved U.S. 
government departments and agencies.190  The nuclear employment strategy did not cite 
what references were used, methodology or even if the detailed analysis was classified.  
For example, what was the composition of those option models and assumptions?  Did 
the options explore drastically lower nuclear weapons or eliminate some or all the nuclear 
triad forces?  What threats are being (and would be) deterred by U.S. strategic forces?  
Probably most important, what was the analysis’ desired end state and timeframe?   
     Unfortunately, there are still more questions on the president’s determination of one-
third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons beyond the New START Treaty.  What is 
the new nuclear employment strategy’s intent to declare the increased reduction when the 
next paragraph states the guidance “does not direct any changes to the currently deployed 
nuclear forces of the United States 191  The determination (and Obama’s announcement 
during the Berlin Speech) may be both a diplomatic gesture—to demonstrate U.S. 
leadership on global nonproliferation—and Obama’s belief that these are “concrete steps 
toward a world without nuclear weapons.”  However, if the U.S. and its allies’ national 
security can be ensured, then why isn’t the president directing DoD now to pursue those 
reduced nuclear warhead limits?  This part is confusing.  Equally perplexing is the 
bureaucratic nod the nuclear employment strategy gives to DoD.  In the next step, “the 
new employment strategy will be translated into guidance from the Secretary of Defense 







development of detailed contingency plans by the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, 
and appropriate functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders.”192  This sounds 
like “bureaucratese,” red tape, and stovepipes in coordination.  The nuclear employment 
strategy’s ambiguity above does not specify a deadline to implement the president’s 
determination to increase the reduction of nuclear weapons or the end-state of the nuclear 
triad.  Instead, the reader is left with such questions on U.S. strategic forces as:  what 
does “translated into guidance…” mean? And what does “inform the development of 
detailed contingency plans…” mean to lowering the nuclear weapons post New START 
Treaty? 
     Concerning the second initiative of the nuclear employment strategy, Launch Under 
Attack,193 the guidance continues to emphasize the decrease in nuclear tensions:  
“Recognizing the significantly diminished possibility of a disarming surprise nuclear 
attack, the guidance directs DoD to examine further options to reduce the role of Launch 
Under Attack plays in U.S. planning, while retaining the ability to Launch Under Attack 
if directed.”194  This appears to express Obama’s concern about the current short, critical 
decision-making time element in response to a satellite-detected nuclear attack on the 
U.S.  Based on the 2010 NPR and nuclear employment strategy, Obama wants more time 
to carefully review definitive evidence of a potential incoming nuclear attack.  Also, he 
may want to understand the Secretary of Defense’s and CJCS’ proposed response 











most critical decision a president as commander in chief can make:  orders to U.S. 
strategic forces to execute a devastating nuclear strike(s) across the globe at an adversary.  
As background to the nuclear employment strategy, the NPR noted key steps to reduce 
the possibility of nuclear launches resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or 
misperceptions and maximize presidential decision time: 
1.) Continuing the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs195 and 
SLBMs so that, in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental 
launch, the missile would land in the open ocean, and asking Russia to re-
confirm its commitment to this practice. 
2.) Further strengthening the U.S. command and control system to maximize 
Presidential decision-making time in a nuclear crisis. 
3.) Exploring new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further 
reduce any incentives for prompt launch.196 
 
The U.S. and RF are no longer on hair-trigger alert postures as they were during the Cold 
War.  Yet the U.S. nuclear triad forces have remained essentially in the same launch 
posture as in the early 1990’s.   
     Key questions for DoD to consider are what will be the entering assumption(s) and 
end state(s) for launch under attack?  For example, does DoD have high confidence of 
nuclear first strike attack by a peer or near peer?  Will the U.S. absorb a nuclear attack 
and allow the “dust to settle” or will it have planned quick strike options? Will DoD’s 
proposal to the president consist of a response to a “bolt-from-the-blue”?  If it does, then 
DoD is still thinking its fighting the Cold War.  It should not consider this response 
option.  According to Paul Bracken,  
The most vivid example of misallocation of resources and attention was the 
preparation for a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack on the United States by the 









attention and budget was given to this problem.  Yet its likelihood was extremely 
low.  This isn’t just a retrospective judgment, it was actually made at the time.  
Surveys in the late 1950’s and 1960’s of strategic analysts at the Rand 
Corporation, the Hudson Institute, and other think tanks showed that their experts 
believed the bolt from the blue was an extremely remote possibility.  Yet it was 
the driver of tremendous attention and billions of dollars.197 
 
     Regarding the second part of the nuclear employment strategy on reducing the role, 
“while retaining the ability to Launch Under Attack if directed,” is confusing and could 
be operationally dangerous.  Again, this phrase appears to maintain the paradigm of the 
DoD bureaucracy:  “reduce or eliminate the function but we should still be able to 
perform the required action(s), just in case we need to.”  As an example of confusion or 
misunderstanding of dual missions, The Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Management (hereinafter Task Force) under the chairmanship of 
former Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger and appointed by Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates on June 12, 2008 to review and address the nuclear mission of the Air Force 
after serious incidents involved its nuclear enterprise.  In August 2006, the Air Force had 
mistakenly shipped to Taiwan classified ballistic missile components—“four fuses 
designed to trigger nuclear and non-nuclear Minuteman III ballistic missiles—instead of 
batteries for utility helicopters the U.S. originally planned to send.”198  The Air Force did 
not discover this misshipment until March 19, 2008.  On August 30, 2008, Air Force 
officers flew their B-52 Stratofortress from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air 









     The Air Force’s mishandling of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related 
materiel prompted DoD to investigate these incidents.  According to the Task Force 
Report, the “investigations revealed a serious erosion of focus, expertise, mission 
readiness, resources, and discipline in the nuclear weapons enterprise within the Air 
Force.”199  As discussed in Chapter 1, when U.S. bombers were directed by President 
George H.W. Bush to permanently stand down from day-to-day nuclear alert, a very 
different mindset began to develop in the bomber community on the nuclear mission.  
According to the Task Force Report, “there was a change in bomber mission focus away 
from a cadre of nuclear experienced personnel to conventional-warfare experienced 
Airmen was accompanied by a gradual decline in nuclear expertise, including in the 
senior leadership.”200  U.S. bomber crews and maintenance personnel were required to 
perform missions involving conventional munitions but also remain proficient in the 
nuclear mission and its core procedures.   The operations tempo of global bomber 
presence shifted that delicate balance for senior AF leaders, bomber crews and 
maintenance personnel.  As DoD reviews and recommends option(s) to the president on 
the ability to reduce the role of “launch under attack” yet still be capable to perform it, 
DoD must remember critical mistakes like the one discussed above when people lose 
focus on the mission.  DoD should ensure senior leadership reinforce the importance of 
the mission to their subordinates, conduct constant and robust training of the launch/or 
not to launch under attack operational procedures to instill confidence and proficiency in 








end-state of Launch Under Attack policy might look like, there is no confusion on what 
two critics think of Obama’s nuclear employment strategy. 
  
Critics’ Op-Ed of Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy. 
     Only a few days after the administration published its report on nuclear employment 
strategy, two former Bush 43 senior officials harshly criticized Obama’s approach on 
nuclear policy.  Eric Edelman, former undersecretary of defense for policy (2005-2009) 
and Robert Joseph, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international 
security (2005-2007) present the view that the U.S. has made enough nuclear weapons 
reductions given the current international environment.  Even the title of their article, 
“Obama is Pursuing Nuclear Folly,” indicates what the tone will be.   Obama 
demonstrates none of these descriptions because he understands and has studied the 
issues of nuclear security and nuclear weapons as has been discussed throughout the 
analysis.  In their opening sentence, the authors write that Obama “announced the next 
step in his quixotic quest to achieve a nuclear-free world.”201   As discussed earlier, the 
nuclear employment strategy is unremarkable and not transformative, but it is not foolish. 
     The authors attempt to depict Obama as strong arming DoD, ignoring the current 
global political environment, and reneging on agreements with the U.S. Senate.  Despite 
the president emphasizing DoD had studied the one-third increase in nuclear warhead 
reductions beyond the New START Treaty, the authors imply Obama of influencing the 







the “numbers would be cooked to support a disarmament agenda.”202   Did Edelman and 
Joseph think DoD would perform this study in a complete vacuum?  This is exactly what 
a president, as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces is supposed to do:  provide 
his vision and framework to DoD and other departments in order to lead the nation and 
accomplish the initiatives he campaigned and was elected by the American people.  Early 
in his presidency, Obama laid out his vision on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation 
through speeches and in his National Security Strategy:  “Pursue the goal of a world 
without nuclear weapons:  while this goal will not be reached during this Administration, 
its active pursuit and eventual achievement will increase global security, keep our 
commitment under the NPT, build our cooperation with Russia and other states…”203   
     The authors continue to portray Obama as singularly focused on a “disarmament 
agenda” and out of touch with the nations seeking to upgrade their nuclear arsenal or 
delivery systems.  Edelman and Joseph ask, “What has changed in the past three years to 
allow for further reductions?”204  Then, they provide a litany of nuclear weapons 
competitors:  North Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, China and RF who seek to expand their 
nuclear enterprise.  At the end of this listing, the authors even include: “Russian Bear-H 
bombers circled Guam, the fastest-growing U.S. base in the Pacific.”205  What does this 
have to do with their argument on nuclear weapons reductions?  There are no nuclear 
weapons on Guam, and more than likely, there were no nuclear weapons on-board that 










discuss the multiple instruments of national power the U.S. possesses—not just nuclear 
weapons—but also conventional forces, diplomacy, finance, trade, cyber and economic to 
utilize in the international community.   
     Instead, when discussing the above nuclear competitor nations, Edelman and Joseph 
neglect to mention key events that were occurring between the U.S. or allies during the 
time of their article publication:  1.) North and South Korea agreed in principle on June 6 
to hold their first official talks for years, signaling a possible breakthrough in cross-
border ties after months of escalated military tensions; 2.) U.S. was in the midst of 
preparation for its fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue on July 10-11, 2013 
in Washington, DC.  The dialogue ended with many commitments including continued 
cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation and to establish hotlines between the Special 
Representatives of the Presidents in order to facilitate communication;206 and 3.) U.S. and 
RF signed the “Framework Agreement on Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program” 
on June 14, 2013, which facilitates cooperation in the area of spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste management in the RF.   
     Finally, the authors infer Obama is providing lip-service to the treaty process with the 
RF and Senate ratification and intends to unilaterally reduce U.S. deployed nuclear 
warheads to 1,000.  They believe Obama is so ideologically committed to “nuclear zero” 
and “disarmament” that he does not want to be derailed either by the Russians or the 
Senate.  Edelman and Joseph state this reduction further weakens U.S. prestige, security 








is the only president not to follow the policy of maintaining “a nuclear capability second 
to none,” as President John F. Kennedy pledged fifty years ago at the Brandenburg Gate.  
This is incorrect because as the analysis has shown, the U.S. continues to fund its nuclear 
enterprise and specifically, the nuclear triad with billions of dollars annually for 
modernization and upgrade programs well into the 21st century.  Obama has thoughtfully 
reduced nuclear weapons in a slow, downward trajectory as his predecessors did.  What 
would a notional nuclear force structure and posture look like that Obama has envisioned 
taking concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons? 
 
An Illustrative Nuclear Force Structure and Posture 
     As discussed above, the RF and PRC still have sizeable nuclear arsenals and other 
regional actors like North Korean and Iran either have ICBMs or will in the near future.  
This requires the U.S. to keep a credible and robust nuclear deterrent to deter attack 
against the homeland, its interests, NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia 
who are protected by the U.S.’s extended deterrence of nuclear weapons.  For its 
deterrent strategy, the U.S. should continue its counterforce targeting of an adversary’s 
valued weapons.  The U.S. should not go back in time to have a first-strike capability.   
     Obama should lead the effort and direct DoD to re-plan the nation’s nuclear forces to 
be transformative to the next phase in significant nuclear weapons reductions beyond the 
New START Treaty.  The president should lead the “clean sheet approach” with his 
advisors and academia on what the current strategic threats are in this environment, who 
the real adversaries the U.S. is intending to deter with its nuclear forces.  According to 




enemy’s leadership values most.”207  Once the president has determined a transformative 
approach on the nuclear force structure based on current and emerging threats and 
constraints, the White House would direct DoD to implement and formalize.  In 
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Robert Kehler, Commander 
of U.S. Strategic Command208 confirmed in March 2013 the defense planning process on 
nuclear force structure:  “The way we determine the size of the force, we don’t start with 
a number. What we start with is a set of national security objectives.  Those objectives 
eventually wind up being military tasks.  Those tasks require a certain number of 
weapons to achieve.” 209  An illustrative nuclear force structure that provides U.S. 
security and credibility of deterrence for allies and friends would consist of 638 strategic 
nuclear weapons—362 to 462 less than the 1,000-1,100 declared in the latest DoD 
Nuclear Employment Strategy Report.   This nuclear arsenal would be on modified alert 
for a short term timeframe and be should fully in place in about 90 days e.g., to ensure 
proper configuration of nuclear warheads, delivery platforms returned to alert status from 
maintenance.   
     The bomber aircraft is the oldest vestige of the Cold War and as discussed in  
Chapter 1 and were removed from day-to-day nuclear alert on September 28, 1991.  
Specifically, B-52s and B-2s which have the capacity to deliver both nuclear and 














conventional only missions.  The nuclear triad would no longer exist; as the Air Force 
refers to its fighter aircraft as “Combat Air Forces,” the remaining components, ICBMs 
and SLBMs would be referred to as “Strategic Nuclear Forces,” not “dyad”—to begin 
breaking out of the paradigm. 
ICBMS. 
     Today, the United States deploys 450 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each with one 
to three warheads.  According to the 2010 NPR, the United States will “deMIRV” 
(reduce to a single warhead) all deployed ICBMs, so that each Minuteman III ICBM has 
only one nuclear warhead.210  This step enhances stability and reduces incentives for 
either side to execute a first strike.  As part of the new approach on nuclear force 
structure, 100 Minuteman III ICBMs would be removed from the national war plan by 
presidential order through the secretary of defense down to on-alert Air Force missile 
crews similar to Minuteman IIs discussed in Chapter 1.  This would leave 350 ICBMs 
with current configuration of a single nuclear warhead deployed and on-alert.   
     From the directive, Air Force missile crews would need to accomplish their 
appropriate emergency action message procedures and remove their launch capability 
from the launch control centers, thus preventing launch of the ICBMs.  The missile 
wing’s maintenance personnel would dispatch to the missile field and physically enter the 
missile silo to place the missile in a “safe” condition (allowing work on the missile) and 
an added measure to prevent any unauthorized access to launch the ICBM.  The 







base weapon storage area.  Since the 20th Air Force,211 is collocated at F.E. Warren AFB, 
Cheyenne WY with the 90th Missile Wing, and the 91st Missile Wing212 is collocated with 
the 5th Bomb Wing213 at Minot AFB ND, the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, 
Great Falls, MT, a singular mission, would be the unit to stand down two of its three 
nuclear missile squadrons—100 ICBMs removed from the national war plan.  
     ICBMs provide significant advantages to the U.S. nuclear force structure, including 
prompt response, extremely secure and reliable command and control, high alert 
readiness rates, greater than 99%,214 and relatively low operating costs.  As analyzed in 
Chapter 2, the Minuteman III ICBM recently completed several life extension programs 
(LEP) with the aim of keeping the force in service to the year 2030.  
 
Submarines.  
     Concerning the Ohio-class strategic submarines (SSBN), there appears to be no viable 
near or mid-term threats to the survivability of U.S. SSBNs, but such threats or other 
technical problems cannot be ruled out over the long term.215  Currently, the Navy 
deploys 14 SSBNs, but as discussed in Chapter 2, it plans to begin procuring and 
deploying 12 “SSBNX” (replacement) submarines in 2021.  Through presidential order 
again, this notional strategic nuclear force would consist of an 8-boat SSBN fleet of 














survivability and stealth would continue to enhance the Strategic Nuclear Forces.  Unlike 
ICBMs that are fixed targets, “SSBNs at sea do not depend on rapid firing for their 
survival and increase decision time in a nuclear crisis.  SSBNs on launch patrol can be 
fired in twelve (12) minutes compared to two (2) minutes for the ICBMs.  There are no 
effective defenses against submarine launched ballistic missile warheads.” 216 
Bombers.   
     U.S. bomber aircraft haven’t been on day-to-day nuclear alert for over twenty years.  
By removing the bombers from the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the U.S. enhances the 
flexibility of its B-52s and B-2s while also complementing the nuclear forces.  Currently, 
bomber aircrews and aircraft maintenance personnel split their day-to-day conventional 
mission by also performing annual refresher training and exercises on nuclear unique 
mission procedures.  In addition to being manned and re-callable, another key attribute of 
the nuclear bomber force, according to the NPR is “they can be visibly forward deployed, 
thereby signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in crisis.”217 The unitary bomber focus 
on conventional would indeed visibly demonstrate U.S. resolve in a crisis with “usable” 
weapons that may not be nuclear but wreaking devastating effects.  For example, a 
behemoth weapon, the “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” (MOP) is a 30,000 pound 
conventional bomb manufactured by Boeing, who was awarded the contract to build and 
develop 20 of the “bunker buster” bombs.  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency has 











designed to reach and destroy an adversary’s weapons of mass destruction located in 
deeply buried and hardened facilities.   
     Air Force and aerospace experts agree that with sufficient funding for sustainment and 
modernization over their expected lifespans, all three of the bombers (eighteen (18) B-
2ASpirit and seventy-six (76) B-52H Stratofortress as well as the B-1) can physically 
continue to be credible weapon systems.218  This could save the American taxpayer 
hundreds of billions of dollars by not having to fund in the near term the research, 
development, testing and procurement of a new long-range bomber. 
Posture. 
     Coupled with a transformative nuclear force strategy is the projection of a forward-
looking U.S. strategic posture.  A Nobel Laureate for Peace who is also the president can 
demonstrate to the world the U.S. is committed to changing the status quo of its 
operational nuclear posture.  DoD, a bureaucracy that clings to the nuclear triad which 
was successful and effective during the Cold War has not demonstrated an innovative 
perspective for a future without U.S. nuclear forces.  DoD focuses on new strategic 
nuclear delivery replacement systems and modernization programs.  However, a 
visionary nuclear posture that establishes real and concrete steps to implement the noble 
idea of “a world without nuclear weapons” can captivate minds and could initiate the next 










Announcement on Nuclear Posture.    
     Obama should set in motion posture actions which are credible to the nation, allies, 
and partners, and respected by Russia and China, as well as North Korea: the U.S.’s 
security is still strong and multidimensional but the Cold War’s strategy and nuclear triad 
is over.   Words and presence have meaning on the international stage.  As JFK delivered 
the dramatic Cuban Missile Crisis news to fellow Americans in October 1962 from the 
Oval Office, Obama should also speak from the Oval Office days leading up to the next 
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in March 2014 in The Netherlands or his last one in 
office, March 2016 in Washington, DC.  As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the NSS has 
developed into in and serves as an open, cooperative and productive orum to address and 
work global nuclear security issues.  Obama’s speech should announce the following on a 
new U.S. nuclear posture:  1.) Like China has in the past, the U.S. declares for the first 
time since the Cold War began, its policy will be no first-use of nuclear weapons; 2.) the 
“sole” (no longer “fundamental” as stated in the NPR and Nuclear Employment Report) 
purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack and prevent an adversarial 
coercion on the U.S. and its allies; 3.) the transformative actions of elimination of the 
nuclear triad and the realignment and reduction of the nuclear force structure to 638 
deployed nuclear warheads; the U.S. will implement through executive order but will 
dialogue with RF to mirror the reductions through a bilateral treaty; 4.) a new effort to 
push for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which eluded 
Presidents Clinton and Bush; demonstrates to the global community the U.S. has ended 
the Cold War and does not intend to pursue new nuclear weapons which would need to 




as well as Great Britain, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency upon 
conclusion of the NSS to remain for a head-of-state summit.  Discussions should focus on 
common strategic (e.g., cyber threats) and economic (e.g., slow global growth) threats 
and challenges; ways and ideas to reduce nuclear weapons and avoidance of potential 
nuclear conflicts; and finally, propose the U.S. and RF share best practices and lessons 
learned on nuclear arms verification and inspection as a building block for future 
cooperative engagement activities with other nuclear weapons states.  
Nuclear Force Structure Realignment. 
     A cornerstone of Obama’s announcements is the change in status quo on U.S. nuclear 
operational posture.  Through orders to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff down to the executing commanders of nuclear weapons, Obama can 
immediately resolve issues raised in the NPR concerning decision-making time and the 
timing to implement the new U.S. policy on the purpose of nuclear weapons—to deter a 
nuclear attack.  The commander-in-chief would direct the U.S. Air Force and Navy to 
implement the new nuclear posture. 
ICBMs. 
     As Bush did in 1991, Obama can order, in this initial phase, the Air Force to 
immediately remove from launch control centers (LCC) the nuclear launch documents 
and equipment (e.g., launch keys) that facilitate missile officer crews remote launching of 
ICBMs.  By having these launch material items removed from the “promptness” feature 








the president gains more time to understand if a potential strategic situation is real or a 
satellite “glitch.”  If the situation becomes a heightened state of tensions, the president 
could direct the return of the launch materials by the missile crew, and be in place within 
approximately 24-48 hours (depending on the local weather and distance to the LCC).  
This action would demonstrate to allies, partners, RF and China that the U.S. is serious 
about leaving the Cold War posture behind by carefully considering strategic options in a 
timely and not “prompt” response manner.  As mentioned above 350220 single nuclear 
warhead ICBMs would comprise the “Strategic Nuclear Forces.” 
Submarines (SSBN). 
     During this phase, the Ohio-class SSBNs would still retain their nuclear launch 
documents and keys because they could be several days, possibly a week from their port 
to retrieve the documents.  The realigned operational nuclear posture would be an 8-boat 
fleet of SSBNs armed with Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), a 
reduction from the current 14 deployed SSBNs; the U.S. Navy would assign five to the 
Pacific Ocean and 3 to the Atlantic Ocean.  For planning purposes, two boats are 
normally in dry dock for significant or “depot-level” maintenance or upgrade.  “The U.S. 
Navy maintain its historical at-sea rate of seventy (70) percent,”221 so one additional 
SSBN would be off-alert for routine maintenance.  This would leave three boats on patrol 
to the Pacific and two to the Atlantic.  These on-alert SSBNs would carry a total of 288 










smaller, yet still credible U.S. nuclear extended arsenal.  The remaining SSBNs that are 
not part of this new configuration could serve to extend the life span of the SSBNs 
through rotational duties and save precious American taxpayer dollars in funding a new 
replacement submarine, known as “SSBNX” and focus on the U.S.’s current and 
emerging threats. 
Complementary elements to the transformative nuclear posture and efficiencies. 
     As the U.S. initiates the elimination of the nuclear triad and drastically reduces the 
reliance and number of nuclear warheads and the associated nuclear infrastructure, its 
allies and partners should continue to value the remaining U.S. extended nuclear 
“umbrella and the complementary elements to it.  For example, allies such as Israel may 
be assured of U.S. conventional bomber capabilities to effectively strike deeply and 
hardened targets such as Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities without resorting to nuclear 
weapons.  In early 2013, U.S. officials “showed Israeli military and civilian leaders secret 
Air Force video of an earlier version of the MOP hitting its target in high-altitude testing 
and explained what had been done to improve it.”222  The latest version of the MOP are 
“adjusted fuses to maximize its burrowing power, upgraded guidance systems to improve 
its precision and high tech equipment intended to allow it to evade Iranian air defenses in 
order to reach and destroy the Fordow nuclear enrichment complex buried under a 
mountain near the Iranian city of Qom.  The upgraded MOP designed for Fordow hasn’t 
been dropped from a plane yet.”223  The idea is to create a crater with the first bomb and 









the underground facility.  Other allies such as Japan and South Korea may also be assured 
of continued U.S. capabilities with the conventional “bunker buster” bomb that could be 
used against North Korea’s nuclear facilities.  U.S officials believe the enhanced MOP 
“would be even more effective against North Korea’s nuclear bunkers, which the U.S. 
thinks aren’t as heavily fortified as Iran’s.”224 
Ballistic Missile Defenses. 
     By continuing to invest and deploy technologies ready to intercept a limited ballistic 
missile attack, the U.S. could significantly reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal and focus 
on the its most immediate threats:  North Korea and Iran ballistic missiles.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2,   the U.S. should continue to implement Hagel’s initiatives on missile 
defense (e.g., increasing GBIs at Fort Greely, AK, deploy an additional early warning 
tracking radar to Japan).  One concern on the U.S.’s part has to do with capacity and 
development for ballistic missile technology.  According to Richard Weitz, “The Missile 
Defense Agency is now struggling to meet the military’s demands for more assets, even 
as the agency tries to develop new technologies to stay ahead of advances being made by 
likely adversaries.  The number of hostile missiles continues to increase, as do their 
capabilities.”225  
Efficiencies. 
     Eliminating the triad, reducing the warhead numbers and changing U.S. policy are 
very important elements to a transformative nuclear posture.  However, the associated 









paradigm.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Department of Energy (DOE)/National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are constructing the Uranium Capabilities 
Replacement (UCR) project at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee.  Initially estimated by NNSA to cost $1 billion and completed in 2018, the 
UCR is now mired in cost overruns and construction delays, and could cost American 
taxpayers $6.5 to $11.5 billion for a facility completed in 2035.  Also, there has not been 
an independent study to verify DOE/NNSA’s claim for the UCR’s capacity to 
remanufacture 200 uranium secondaries,226 a key component of a nuclear warhead, in 
order to keep nuclear weapons reliable.227  The U.S. should cancel the UCR project.  An 
alternative is an existing facility called the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas which “has 
the capacity to take on one of the most important missions of the UCR project:  the 
recertification of highly enriched uranium secondaries.”228  Additionally, switching to the 
Pantex Plant would enhance safety by reducing “the transportation of nuclear weapons 
components across the country and fit well with the Pantex mission.”229  With finite 
resources, the president as chief executive officer of the Federal government must direct 
re-programming this exorbitant funding of a Cold War paradigm to one focused on 

















      
      For this research thesis, the analysis examined in Chapter 1, “Relic of a Bygone Era?” 
the history of the U.S. nuclear triad, a theory by James Q. Wilson on bureaucracy which 
to interpret DoD’s approach to the reduction in the global nuclear attack threat and how it 
retains the nuclear triad even after the Cold War has ended; two cases show this 
bureaucratic stasis.  In Chapter 2, “Affordable Tool to Fix 21st Century Threats?” the 
analysis discussed:  the current threats facing the U.S., bilateral nuclear cooperative 
engagement activities with the Russian Federation (RF) and People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), the nuclear triad modernization and replacement program costs, and current and 
future technologies and capabilities.  Finally, in Chapter 3, “Is It the Right Strategy for 
the 21st Century?” the analysis reviewed: Obama’s accomplishments in nuclear-related 
areas, his June 2013 guidance on U.S. nuclear weapons employment strategy, and critics’ 
op-ed article on the new guidance.  The analysis presented an illustrative or notional 
nuclear strategy, force structure and posture that could be implemented by the U.S. 
immediately. 
     In Chapter 1, the analysis reviewed what should have ended the nuclear triad on 
September 28, 1991, when President George H.W. Bush directed all Minuteman II 
ICBMs and bombers assigned to the national nuclear war plan removed from that mission 
as part of the START II treaty.   B-52 and B-1 bombers were no longer on day-to-day 
alert ready to launch with nuclear weapons loaded, the first time since Cold War began 
about forty years earlier.  Minuteman II ICBMs were removed from the strategic war 




earlier, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had resigned.  The “Cold war days 
are over.”230        
     On June 16, 1992, Bush and RF President Boris Yeltsin patted each other for the 
rapidity in agreement over nuclear arms cuts—21,000 to 3,000-3500 nuclear warheads 
between the two nations.  Yeltsin encapsulated what the new relationship between the 
two countries had evolved to:   
“Indeed, we have been able to cut, over those 5 months of negotiations, the total 
number of nuclear warheads to one-third, while it took 15 years under the START 
Treaty to make some reductions. This is an expression of the fundamental change 
in the political and economic relations between the United States of America and 
Russia. It is also an expression and proof of the personal trust and confidence that 
has been established between the Presidents of these countries, President Bush of 
the United States of America and the President of Russia.”231  
 
     However, twenty years after the Cold War ended in December 1991, the U.S. still 
maintains the nuclear triad as its national security centerpiece.  Why?  Three potential 
arguments were analyzed:  1.) deterrence is still important; 2.) there is symbolic value to 
weapons; and 3.) the bureaucracy wants to keep the nuclear triad because that’s what 
bureaucracies do.  For the literature review, the analysis examined two studies in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) community that reviewed a nuclear arsenal of 300.        
     In the first study, “Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions about Nuclear 
Forces and Postures,” termed “working paper,” by Paul K. Davis, an analyst with the 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, is a quantitative approach to nuclear force 










primary issues of nuclear strategy and policy, and a taxonomy of options assessment on 
nuclear forces, policy and other deterrence issues.  The study is disappointing for three 
reasons:  1.) the author’s use of pejorative terms and phrases to describe past deterrent 
value and previous arms control agreements; 2.) lack of incorporation of current and 
future technologies and capabilities; and 3.) analytic model listings perpetuate the 
discussion on the numbers of nuclear weapons in a Cold War mindset.   
     The second study was by three authors associated with the U.S. Air Force who wrote 
about deterrence and an appropriate size for the nuclear triad.  The authors stated the real 
question to be asked is “What size force is needed for deterrence?” and explained a 
nuclear triad of 311 nuclear warheads could be an effective strategy.  Although 
commendable to recommend a low amount of nuclear warheads, however, merely 
shrinking the numbers of nuclear weapons would still leave unresolved the focus and 
continued sustainment and procurement of replacement systems for the nuclear triad and 
its associated infrastructure.  There needs to be a re-focused discussion on U.S. nuclear 
strategy, posture and the new threats facing the U.S., not just reducing the warhead 
numbers.  Other impacts such as sustainment and deployment of all three components of 
the nuclear triad and the nuclear support enterprise also needs to be addressed. 
     The analysis has shown that DoD is unable to project the forward vision, innovation 
and skilled leadership to identify the necessary and critical tasks on the U.S. nuclear triad 
and provide the sense of mission to its personnel, as it relates to James Q. Wilson’s 
theory on bureaucracy.  DoD clings to the systems and frameworks that have successfully 
worked in the past and continue to use them in the present and perpetuates in the future.   




factors such as the evaporation of a bipolar world and rise of a multi-polar one, high 
national debt and budget deficits, ballistic missile threats, and emerging technologies and 
capabilities.   
     The analysis examined two cases which showed that DoD will continue to mire in the 
status quo and unlikely to lead and identify the critical tasks and provide the sense of 
mission as Wilson’s theory suggest, for a new nuclear weapons force strategy and 
framework.  The first case concerns the digitization of military health records, and the 
second one analyzed was the use of paper technical orders (TO) or user manual to operate 
the ICBM weapon system. 
     The bureaucratic stagnation explanation of the persistence of the nuclear triad is 
consistent with the way that the defense-related bureaucracies approach new technologies 
and innovation.  The first case, digitization of health records demonstrated how defense-
related bureaucracies are all too willing to fight the last—rather than the next—war.  
Digitization has been a clarion call by presidents to steer the nation in investing and 
utilizing current technologies to continue advancing this new age of information 
technology (IT).  Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have called for (even issuing an 
executive order) in essence digital medical records for service members and veterans.  
The analysis reviewed GAO reports that found little progress in a seamless electronic 
health record system between DoD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  There 
were barriers in key IT management areas of strategic planning, enterprise architecture 
and investment management—DoD and VA leadership do not understand this mission.  
So, uniformed Armed Services personnel when they retire or are medically discharged 




     In Case 2, the analysis examined that ICBM missile officer crews (missileers) are still 
issued and use paper TOs or user manuals to operate and troubleshoot procedures dealing 
with the missile (about 400 pages) and the multiple communication systems (about 400 
pages) under their charge.  Other Air Force oversight agencies possess these same paper 
TOs.  However, the Air Force does not allow the sole use of the electronic or digitized 
TO procedures that are resident in launch control center (LCC) computer because missile 
crews have always used their paper TOs.  Also, the Air Force does not have confidence in 
the currency of the digitized TO checklists: a new procedure or immediate change may 
not be immediately resident into the LCC. 
     In Chapter 2, the analysis examined the current significant threats to the U.S.:  cyber 
attacks, skyrocketing national debt and budget deficits, RF and PRC nuclear 
modernization programs and ballistic missile threats.   Additionally, the analysis 
reviewed nuclear-related cooperative threat reduction programs with the RF and PRC and 
U.S. nuclear modernization and replacement programs.  Finally, the analysis highlighted 
current, emerging and future technologies the U.S. should fund and continue to pursue.   
     The newest form of attack is cyber attack which a nation or its proxy wages on other 
nations or adversaries, and encompasses cyber war, terrorism, espionage, protest, 
vandalism and crime.  What’s new about this threat is that anyone with a computer can 
hack a high-value target like a government network or bank financial database and 
remain essentially anonymous and hard to track down.  The analysis examined that unlike 
the national strategy on nuclear weapons, the U.S. still has no overarching national 
strategy on cyber attacks which addresses the nature of threats, programs, roles and 




the financial and technical means to thwart this capability or the cyber attacks could 
potential wreak catastrophic damages.  If the U.S. is unable to determine and exercise a 
national strategy on cyber, according to then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 
October 2012, these attacks “could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause 
physical destruction and the loss of life.  In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation 
and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability.”      
     Another threat to the U.S. is its skyrocketing national debt and budget deficits.  At  
$17.1 trillion, U.S. public debt has grown $5 trillion in the last five years and the ability 
to reduce it faces deep partisan politics due to the political party’s view on the role of 
government.  So paralysis in solving the ever-climbing national debt is the result.  The 
U.S. must to rise above the politics to lead and get its fiscal house in order to preserve its 
financial solvency.  If a foreign country such as China or Japan, the two largest holders of 
treasury debt perceive the U.S. is no longer the safe haven for investment, then capital 
inflows to the U.S. may eventually slow or dry up, raising interests nationally and 
globally.  This event could undermine U.S. economic and diplomatic hegemony as well 
as the ability to fund research and develop emerging and future weapon systems that 
could project American power.   
     The analysis reviewed the RF’s and PRC’s nuclear modernization programs.  Both are 
investing in upgraded current weapon systems.  Both countries have sizeable nuclear 
arsenals and the RF is the nuclear peer to the U.S.  The U.S. and RF have signed and 
ratified the New START Treaty limiting deployed nuclear warheads.  The PRC’s stated 




     An important consideration in bilateral relations between the U.S. and RF and PRC is 
the significant funding and effort the U.S. dedicates to both those countries in cooperative 
engagements.  Since the Cold War ended, the U.S. and RF signed an agreement to 
facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear, chemical, and other 
weapons in the RF and the destruction of those weapons to comply with START II 
requirements.   Regarding the PRC, the U.S. has conducted multiple rounds of the 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue.  The U.S. and PRC have signed an agreement to 
establish a joint Center of Excellence in Nuclear Security which will promote cooperation 
and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security best practices and combat 
nuclear terrorism.   
     With the election of George W. Bush, the U.S. became very concerned with the 
growing threat of ballistic missiles especially from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.  This 
concern was so great, the U.S. left the ABM Treaty in 2002 so that it could develop and 
deploy ballistic defense systems to counter a potential limited ballistic missile attack.  
Bush emplaced ballistic missile defense system to protect the homeland, its military 
forces, allies and partners.  The U.S. also emplaced interceptor missiles at Fort Greely, 
Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA to defend against intermediate and 
intercontinental ballistic missile threats.  There was also a defense systems against shorter 
range ballistic missile threats, the PAC-3 interceptor and the Aegis ship Standard Missile 
(SM)-3. 
     Obama directed the first-ever Congressionally-mandated review of U.S. ballistic 
missile defense policies, strategies, plans, and programs.   The Undersecretary of Defense 




the U.S. is “currently protected against a limited ballistic missile attack, and will continue 
to be so for the foreseeable future.”  She also stated ballistic missile defenses are directed 
against regional actors such as North Korea and Iran, and not intended to affect the 
strategic balance with Russia or China.   According to the BMD report, the U.S. will 
continue to assess realistic ballistic missile systems that are deployable and fiscally 
sustainable over the long-term.  These new BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to 
adapt as threats change as demonstrated by Secretary Hagel’s March 2013 announcement 
on a series of steps to stay ahead of the North Korea and Iran’s development of longer-
range ballistic missile threat. 
     The analysis also examined that like the RF and PRC, the U.S. is modernizing its 
nuclear triad and funding research and development program to implement replacement 
programs for the components of the nuclear triad:  ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs.  The 
analysis highlighted the president’s FY13 budget on nuclear-related items:  $4.6 billion 
for strategic systems such as a new nuclear-capable bomber force and a submarine 
replacement fleet to the current Ohio-class that will cost the American taxpayers over 
$100 billion over its life-span into the 22nd century.  The U.S. should re-align its nuclear 
strategy, policies and funding to resolve these threats, and pursue current, emerging and 
future technologies the analysis reviewed such as the Orbital Test Vehicle, X-37B, a 
reusable unmanned spacecraft that could ensure U.S. access to space and the Boeing 
Phantom Eye, an unmanned next generation aircraft system that can conduct intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance at high-altitude and long durations.  
     In Chapter 3, the analysis examined Obama’s significant accomplishments in the 




declared “The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of 
the Cold War,” and envisioned “a world without nuclear weapons,” Obama set forth the 
path to take concrete steps to implement his goal.   First, he signed a new nuclear arms 
reduction treaty, New START Treaty with RF in 2010; it reduced by 150 nuclear 
warheads from the previous levels in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
signed by Bush and Putin.  Second, in 2010 his administration conducted the first NPR 
since 2002 declaring two significant changes from previous NPRs:  the U.S. would 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in in its national security strategy and not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT and 
in incompliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.  Third, Obama’s new 
initiative to host global leaders at a biennial forum called the Nuclear Security Summit 
(NSS) became a successful platform to discuss nuclear weapons and materials security—
a shared concern with the more than 40 nations and organization who attended the 2010 
and 2012 NSS.  The NSS became a springboard for Obama to engage with the global 
community to include RF President Medvedev and PRC President Hu Jintao cooperative 
engagement activities to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in an abandoned test site in 
Kazakhstan or establishing a nuclear security center of excellence in Beijing, China.   
     Next, the analysis reviewed Obama’s June 2013 eight and one-half page nuclear 
employment strategy report.  This document, a follow-up to the 2010 NPR, was 
unremarkable, bureaucratic and not transformative in its approach on nuclear policy and 
nuclear force structure.  The guidance repeated a few phrases many times throughout the 
report such as “to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China.”  Besides 




additional reason to retain the nuclear triad.  Hedging is the continued sustainment of 
weapons life extension programs and new or upgrade nuclear facilities construction.  
Even though the U.S. faces shrinking government budgets, then Secretary of Defense 
Gates wrote in the 2010 NPR that DoD would transfer $5 billion to the Department of 
Energy to maintain the nuclear triad, its modernization programs and infrastructure.   
Precious American taxpayer dollars should be carefully planned and invested towards 
capabilities against current and future threats, not continue to fight the Cold War.  
     Finally, the analysis presented an illustrative or notional nuclear force structure and 
posture.  In this illustration, through executive order the president would direct the 
nuclear triad would no longer exist—bombers removed from day-to-day nuclear alert in 
1991 would permanently stay conventional instead of the current bouncing back and forth 
from nuclear training exercises and conventional missions.  The new nuclear structure,  
“Strategic Nuclear Forces” would consist of 350 single nuclear warhead ICBMs and 288 
nuclear warheads deployed on SLBMs of an 8-boat fleet, for a total of 638—hundreds of 
nuclear warheads less than Obama’s new nuclear strategic guidance.  This significant 
decline in nuclear warheads and assigning bombers to conventional-only missions would 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S.’s national security strategy.  
     Regarding the illustrative nuclear posture, the president with his accomplishments and 
progress in the nuclear-related areas has the credibility to announce in an Oval Office 
speech that the new U.S. policy is no-first use of nuclear weapons, and that he’s directed 
that the country’s most responsive element of the nuclear force structure, ICBMs, would 
no longer have missile crew officers possessing the launch documents and equipment 




that nuclear weapons are solely to deter nuclear attacks, not just fundamentally.  These 
actions would still protect the U.S.’s national security as well its allies’ and emplace the 
meaningful steps towards “a world without nuclear weapons.”  Also, these actions would 
enhance the U.S.’s global reputation for bold and transformative steps towards nuclear 
nonproliferation, including the president’s Oval Office announcement of an invitation to 
other presidents of the nuclear weapons states and other selected leaders.  These leaders 
and Obama would remain after the next NSS and discuss the next steps towards 
multilateral nuclear arms reductions and other common areas of strategic interest such as 
cyber attacks. 
     Over the last 68 years, history has shown that the president is the most influential 
person on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons.  The president must have the vision and 
courage to lead these transformative actions in order to re-align the U.S. national security 
away from nuclear weapons and perpetuation of funding the Cold War weapon systems.  
As the Chief Executive Officer of the federal government, the president’s leadership is 
required to eliminate the funding prioritization of the costly nuclear programs and 
infrastructure like the Uranium Capabilities Replacement facility--$11 billion.  His vision 
should be to focus on the 21st century threats, prioritize funding to research and develop 
emerging and future technologies and capabilities, procure the equipment and train high 
quality people to successfully counter those national security threats.   
     With the U.S. relationship with the RF and PRC transformed, the nuclear triad that 
was developed and meant for the bipolar world which has disappeared, also needs to 
change.  As the analysis has shown, DoD is unable to lead and innovate the changes 




out of the paradigm.  Even at the height of the Cold War, a president envisioned 
innovation, efficiency and break from the government bureaucracy: 
 But hard decisions must be made.  Unneeded facilities or projects must be phased 
Unneeded facilities or projects must be phased out.  The defense establishment 
must be lean and fit, efficient and effective, always adjusting to new opportunities 
and advances, and planning for the future.  The national interest must be weighed 
against special or local interests; and it is the national interest that calls upon us to 
cut our losses and cut back those programs in which a very dim promise no longer 
justifies a very large cost…232 












Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert letter to  
President John F. Kennedy  
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